Appeals in the AD HOC International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases by Drumbl, Mark A. & S.,  Kenneth, Gallant
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
Volume 3 Issue 2 Article 16 
2001 
Appeals in the AD HOC International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, 
Procedure, and Recent Cases 
Mark A. Drumbl 
Kenneth S. Gallant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Drumbl and Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the AD HOC International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, 
Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 589 (2001). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol3/iss2/16 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of 





APPEALS IN THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: STRUCTURE, PROCEDURE,
AND RECENT CASES
Mark A. Drumbl and Kenneth S. Gallant*
INTRODUCTION
Two international criminal tribunals are developing and re-
making much of international humanitarian law-the law of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These are
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
* Mark A. Drumbl is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. Kenneth S. Gallant is a Professor of Law at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. The authors wish
to thank Stuart Beresford, Andrea Carcano, and Xavier Tracol for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article. Any remaining errors are the authors' own.
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(" ICTY")' and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR" ).
For the first time, appellate practice and procedure have
become vital to the development of international humanitarian
law. These two ad hoc Tribunals have substantial appellate as
well as trial jurisdiction. In this, they are quite different from
their historic predecessors, the International Military Tribunals
at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, which had no
appellate jurisdiction or appellate courts. The appellate
jurisprudence of these new Tribunals is contributing to the
growth of international law, both in international fora and in the
domestic courts of many nations.3
The Tribunals are unusual in that they have common judges
in their Appeals Chambers and have a single Prosecutor, based
in The Hague, Netherlands. The current Prosecutor is Carla Del
Ponte of Switzerland. Each of the Tribunals operates separate
Trial Chambers and a separate Registry (the ICTY in The
Hague, Netherlands; the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania), and the
Deputy Prosecutors are different in each. They also have
separate subject matter mandates, in that they have jurisdiction
over crimes committed in different places and at different times,
and, to some extent, the crimes within the jurisdiction of each
Tribunal are different.
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have issued important
judgments. In so doing, they have clarified the statutory and
general law governing military behavior, human rights, crimes
I. Formally, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (approving and adopting Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-
General's Rep.], U.N. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993) (setting out, as an Annex to the
Report, the Statute of the ICTY [hereinafter ICTY Statute]), as amended).
2. Formally, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide
and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between I
January 1994 and 31 December 1994. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453d
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (setting out as an Annex to the Resolution the
Statute of the ICTR [hereinafter ICTR Statute]), as amended.
3. See infra nn. 9-13, 353-56, and accompanying text.
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against humanity, and genocide (as well as defenses to these
charges), thereby establishing a strong foundation for the
eventual permanent International Criminal Court contemplated
by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.'
Looking more at the short term, though, successes with this ad
hoc approach to promoting accountability for mass violence
have prompted calls for the establishment of similar tribunals for
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. These ad hoc tribunals
will remain necessary at least until the International Criminal
Court (which will have only prospective jurisdiction5) comes
into existence. There also have been suggestions that ad hoc
tribunals be established to adjudge some or all of those
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attack on the United
States.6
Part I of this Article introduces the Tribunals and addresses
their unusual appellate structure, discussing both appellate
jurisdiction and procedures and including changes the Security
Council made to the appellate structure in 2000.' Part II
summarizes the work of the Appeals Chambers in its review of
some important trial decisions of both Tribunals from January
2000 to Fall 2001.' Given that nearly all ICTY and ICTR trial
4. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on July 17,
1998, as corrected by the proc~s-verbaux of November 10, 1998 and July 12, 1999
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. As of April 30, 2001, thirty nations had ratified the ICC Statute,
out of sixty required for the International Criminal Court to come into existence. Well over
one hundred nations have signed the Statute. The United States signed the ICC Statute on
December 31, 2000. The ICC Statute has not yet been submitted to the Senate for
ratification, and the current administration has no plans to do so. See H.R. Subcomm. on
Com., J., State & Jud. of the Comm. on Appropriations, Hearings on Fiscal Year 2002
State Department Appropriations, 107th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2001) (testimony of Secretary of
State Colin Powell).
5. ICC Stat. art. 11.
6. If this proves to be the case, the ICTY and ICTR will serve as crucial precedents.
7. S.C. Res. 1329, 4240th mtg., S/RES/1329 (Nov. 30, 2000) and Annexes, amending
ICTY Stat. arts. 12-14, and ICTR Stat. arts. 11-13.
8. Our choice here is temporal and not hierarchical. Many Appeals Chambers
decisions issued prior to 2000 are particularly germane to the development of international
humanitarian law. These groundbreaking early decisions are amply discussed in the
academic literature (for example, the ICTY Tadic interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction and
the Tadic decision itself, which resolved the question of whether the Bosnian conflict was
internal or international). See infra n. 258 and accompanying text.
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judgments have been appealed, the Appeals Chambers play a
central role in the functioning of the Tribunals.
Important use is being made of the appellate jurisprudence
of the Tribunals. Judgments are being used as precedent within
the Appeals Chambers and by the Trial Chambers.9 The
jurisprudential effect of Appeals Chamber decisions (and the
Statutes creating the Tribunals) also is being felt in national
courts.'0 Within the United States, however, the national use of
9. See infra Part I(D)(4), discussing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14 (ICTY App.
Chamber 2000). Although this may not seem newsworthy to a common law lawyer, the
emergence of stare decisis within the Tribunals is an important development in
international law. Compare e.g. ICC Stat. art. 21 (created after several years of operation of
the ad hoc Tribunals, permitting the use of precedent) with e.g. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 59 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (stating
that a decision is not binding except between the parties and in respect of the particular
controversy). Unlike its use in common law countries, use of judicial precedent is not at the
core of the civil law legal tradition. The Tribunals represent an admixture of civil law legal
systems and common law systems. The civil law approach, which dominates Western and
Eastern Europe, Central and South America, and other areas including the Middle East and
Asia, can be distinguished from the common law in a variety of ways, including that the
civil code is the principal source of law that judges are to apply to a given dispute before
them. As the logical thought process in the civil law system is deductive (going from the
code provision to the dispute before the judge) and not inductive (analogizing from prior
and similar fact situations to resolve the dispute before the judge), the usefulness of
precedent is lower. Although some areas of law in civil law countries have developed
through judge-made law, express acknowledgment of the precedential value of cases by
courts remains the exception rather than the rule. For greater discussion of the differences
between the common law and civil law, see Peter Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and
Civil Law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1591 (1992).
10. See, for example, the judgment of the House of Lords in Regina v. Bartle, 38
I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson citing ICTY judgment in Prosecutor v.
Furundzija as supporting the point that torture is an international crime on its own, even if
separated from war or hostilities, and that the prohibition of torture has evolved into a
peremptory norm (orjus cogens) of international law; Lord Millet citing ICTY decision in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija as supporting the point that a crime that is contrary to a
peremptory norm of international law that infringes a jus cogens may attract universal
jurisdiction under customary international law). See also In re Former Syrian Ambassador
to German Democratic Republic (Bundesverfassungsgericht [federal constitutional court of
the Federal Republic of Germany] June 10, 1997) (unreported; on file with authors)
(drawing a distinction between the immunity of a diplomat and the immunity of a head of
state or governmental official and relying on the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, both of
which provide that the official position of an accused, whether as a leader of a state or as a
responsible official in a government department, does not serve to free that individual from
responsibility or mitigate punishment); U.S. v. Burns, I S.C.R. 283 (Sup. Ct. Canada 2001)
(refusing on constitutional grounds to extradite two Canadians to the United States to face
capital murder charges unless assurances were given that the death penalty would not be
sought, and noting "that the United Nations Security Council excluded the death penalty
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Tribunal jurisprudence is at best inchoate." In fact, it is fair to
say that the Tribunals have a lower profile in the United States
than in many other nations; accordingly, an important purpose of
this Article is to increase awareness for the bench and bar within
the United States (as well as other jurisdictions) of the
Tribunals, their work, their structure, and their purpose. After
all, these appellate decisions have a significant effect on
customary international law, in particular those peremptory
norms of customary international law from which no derogation
is possible (jus cogens), which form part of the federal common
law 2 and for which a private right of action may be implied in
the event of an alleged violation.'3 As a result, the jurisprudence
of the Appeals Chambers can be raised as persuasive authority
in United States courts or offered as proof of the customary
nature of an international legal rule.
Given the effects of globalization on the law, the types of
claims that could invoke the areas of international law covered
by ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence-genocide, crimes against
from the punishments available to the [ICTY] and [ICTRI despite the heinous nature of the
crimes [involved]").
1I. For an example of the incorporation of a Tribunal judgment in domestic law, see
Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 & n. 10 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing the ICTY Trial
Chamber's 1996 sentencing judgment in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic to support the
"universally recognized principle that obedience to superior orders does not relieve an
official from responsibility for humanitarian law or human rights violations").
12. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (international law
forms part of U.S. federal law); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (generally
providing that international law is part of U.S. law and "must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction"); Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmt. c (1987). For a criticism of this
generally accepted position, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 815 (1997) (arguing that the "modern" view that customary international law
forms part of the federal common law departs from well-accepted notions of American
democracy and federalism and that, absent a clear rule from a federal statute or treaty, state
courts and legislatures should be free to treat as they wish or even ignore customary
international law); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, HI, The Current
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997)
(reiterating their position against the "modem" view); contra Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law? Il1 Harv. L. Rev. 1824 (1998) (criticizing Bradley &
Goldsmith's position).
13. Federal courts may, but appear to be reluctant to, imply a private right of action for
violations of jus cogens norms of international law in the absence of a statutorily provided
right of action. See e.g. White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
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humanity, and war crimes-are appearing more frequently on
the dockets of United States courts. These sorts of claims
include, but are not limited to the following:
* Claims regarding crimes against humanity arising from
the September 1i, 2001 terrorist attacks (and also any civil
claims arising out of that tragedy);
* Claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act (giving federal
courts jurisdiction over claims brought by aliens for
violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States);
* Claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (giving a
right of civil action for damages against an individual who,
under actual or apparent authority of any foreign nation,
subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing);
e Restitutionary claims for slave labor and conversion (for
example, arising out of World War II or other armed
conflicts);
* War crimes proceedings involving United States military
personnel or foreign military personnel over which the
United States has "effective control";
" Extradition claims;
* Refugee, asylum, and immigration claims; and
* Non-statutory tort claims (against foreign governments
for human rights abuses and terrorism; against United
States companies for environmental desecration arising out
of their foreign operations; and possibly even by American
citizens against United States authorities).
This jurisprudence also should be central to instructing all
branches of the armed forces on appropriate protocol and
conduct. Accordingly, knowledge of and familiarity with the
work of the Tribunals is of growing importance for effective
judging and lawyering, even in domestic settings. Reviewing
this jurisprudence, particularly in the area of sentencing, also
can serve an illuminating comparative function for those
operating within domestic criminal law or thinking about the
ability of the criminal law to address hate crime. Finally,
reviewing the structures of the Appellate Chambers can be
insightful for domestic law reform and judicial reorganization
efforts.
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The authors also hope this Article will be useful as an
introductory overview of the appellate process in the ICTY and
ICTR for those counsel from any nation considering taking a
case on appeal in the Tribunals. Such counsel should, however,
take care to consult the Tribunals for updated information, as the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for both Tribunals have been
in constant evolution since they were initially promulgated.1
4
I. STRUCTURE, APPELLATE JURISDICTION, AND PROCEDURE IN
THE AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
The Appeals Chambers of the ICTY and ICTR decide (I)
judgment (conviction or acquittal) appeals; (2) sentence
appeals; 5 (3) interlocutory appeals on jurisdictional matters and
(in the ICTY only) procedural matters; 6 and (4) some special
appeals.'7 By and large, they have spent much of their time on
interlocutory appeals, though the scope of interlocutory appeals
has recently been limited.
The Appeals Chambers are unusually structured. Formally,
each Tribunal has its own Appeals Chamber, and each Appeals
Chamber is administratively served by the Registry of its own
Tribunal. The two Appeals Chambers have common judges,
however. A judge from either Tribunal who is appointed to the
Appeals Chamber will hear appeals from the Trial Chambers of
both Tribunals.'8 In terms of judgment appeals, the Appeals
Chambers can review both findings of law and of fact, but the
scope of that review is limited. There are no juries in ICTR or
ICTY trials,' 9 so judges are finders of fact as well as law at both
the trial and appellate levels. The interlocutory appeals have
been very important insofar as the Tribunals are new and as
many procedural formalities have to be established by
14. The research in this article ends as of October 23, 2001.
15. Judgment and sentence appeals are discussed infra in Part I(C)(1).
16. For the difference in interlocutory appeals between the Tribunals, see infra Part
I(C)(2).
17. For special appeals, see infra Part I(C)(3). Post-appeal review proceedings are
discussed briefly infra in Part I(E).
18. ICTY Stat. arts. 11, 12 & 17; ICTR Stat. arts. 11, 12 & 16.
19. Juries are not found in civil law countries, nor are juries much used in most
common law countries, the United States excepted.
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precedent. But several important judgment and sentence appeal
decisions also have been issued. Because these decisions have
widespread precedential and law-making influence, they shall
constitute the focus of Part II of this Article.
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have jurisdiction over a
similar group of particularly heinous crimes, described as
widespread, flagrant, and serious violations of international
humanitarian law.2° These crimes are genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Readers unfamiliar with the details of
international criminal law may have difficulty separating these
crimes, or they may view them as somewhat indistinguishable.
There are very important distinctions between the members of
this triumvirate of terror. Accordingly, these distinctions merit a
brief review so that the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the
Tribunals can be better understood.
Genocide means the killing of or causing serious harm to
members of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group with
the intent to destroy that particular group, in whole or in part.2 '
Proof of this mental element-the intent to destroy-is one
factor that distinguishes genocide from crimes against humanity
and war crimes. The violence in Rwanda was genocidal in
nature (and the ICTR has issued several convictions for
genocide). On August 2, 2001, the ICTY Trial Chamber
convicted Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic of genocide for
his role in the massacre of 7,000 Muslims in Srebrenica, a
purported United Nations "safe haven" in eastern Bosnia. This
was the first finding of genocide in Europe since World War II.
Krstic was sentenced to forty-six years in prison.22 Slobodan
Milosevic now faces charges that include genocide.
20. G.A. Res. 827, U.N. GAOR (May 25, 1993) (creating the ICTY); G.A. Res. 955,
U.N. GAOR (Nov. 8, 1994) (creating the ICTR).
21. ICTY Stat. art. 4; ICTR Stat. art. 2.
22. Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33, Judgement (ICTY Tr. Chamber Aug. 2, 2001). As
of the time of this writing, Krstic is appealing his conviction and sentence, and this appeal
will offer for the ICTY Appeals Chamber an opportunity to pronounce itself on the law of
genocide, ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./PA021, The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia Will Resume Hearings on 27 August 2001
<http://www.un.org/icty/press real/ADV010824.htm> (Aug. 24, 2001). It had previously
affirmed the Trial Chamber's decision to acquit another indictee on genocide charges.
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber, July 5,
2001).
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Moreover, much of the violence in the former Yugoslavia
has been prosecuted under the rubric of crimes against humanity
or war crimes. Broadly speaking, crimes against humanity
involve a series of acts-including murder, enslavement,
extermination, deportation, persecution, and torture-that are
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population.23  The ICTY has been
instrumental in expanding the jurisprudence of crimes against
humanity to include sex crimes. There is some difference
between the definitions of crimes against humanity in the
Statutes of the two Tribunals.24
War crimes cover two sorts of activities: (1) crimes
committed in international armed conflict, such as willful
killing, torture, and inhuman treatment; and (2) violations of the
laws and customs of war, a residual category that can apply to
internal armed conflicts. 25  A broader array of conduct is
prohibited in international armed conflict than in internal armed
conflict; civilians and prisoners are accorded more protection
during international armed conflict than internal armed conflict.
As such, much of the jurisprudence of the ICTY has been
concerned with determining whether the Balkan Wars were in
fact international or internal armed conflicts, and, if
international, the point at which they became so. The more
restrictive scope of crimes within internal armed conflicts flows
from states' concerns about external regulation of internal
affairs, as well as their ability to deal with sedition, uprising,
armed secession movements, and insurgency.
23. ICTY Stat. art. 5; ICTR Stat. art. 3.
24. For example, although the ICTY jurisdiction is not limited to widespread and
systematic attacks, it is limited to crimes "committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character." ICTY Stat. art. 5. The jurisprudence of the ICTY has
distanced itself from the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed during
armed conflict. As for the ICTR, its grant of jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against
humanity covers "persons responsible for ... crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds .... " ICTR Stat. art. 3. The most contemporary and
precedential definition of crimes against humanity, found in the ICC Statute, accords
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity when they arise "as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."
ICC Stat. art. 7.
25. ICTY Stat. arts. 2 & 3; ICTR Stat. art. 4.
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Also important, by way of introduction, is the fact that
neither the ICTY nor the ICTR can impose the death penalty.
That the death penalty cannot be imposed for genocidal mass
murderers both reflects and contributes to the disfavor with
which the death penalty is perceived under international law.
The law of Rwanda, however, permits the imposition of the
death penalty, and persons tried in the national courts have been
executed for participation in the genocide.26
A. Introduction to the Tribunals: Background and Jurisdiction
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The ICTY was established in 1993 by United Nations
Security Council Resolution 827. It is mandated to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991. Serious conflict began in the early 1990s
when Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Bosnia) separated from Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic state. 7 The
remaining parts of Yugoslavia were Serbia and Montenegro,
which collectively form what is now known as the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (the "FRY" ).28 The FRY viewed these
separations as secessions, leading to the Balkan Wars of 1992-
1995, while the international community generally considered
the actions of Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia to be
state succession.29
These conflicts predominantly pitted Croat against Serb
and Muslim against Serb, with much of the violence taking
26. There have been twenty-two executions in Rwanda. The death penalty has yet to be
abolished in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although it has not been imposed since
the 1980s. The death penalty has been abolished in all the other states that made up the
former Yugoslavia. But this was not the case at the time the fighting began in 1991.
27. See Lori Lyman Bruun, Beyond the 1948 Convention-Emerging Principles of
Genocide in Customary International Law, 17 Md. J. Intl. L. & Trade 193, 199 (Fall 1993).
28. Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals, 37
Tex. Intl. L.J. I11, 122 (Winter 2002).
29. Bruun, supra n. 27, at 199-200.
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place first in Croatia (primarily Croat against Serb, following the
Yugoslav invasion of Croatia), and then in the deeply multi-
ethnic regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.0 The war in Croatia led
to massive migrations of both Serbs and Croats.3' To varying
extents, all parties to the Bosnian conflict-Serb, Muslim, and
Croat-sought to "ethnically cleanse" parts of Bosnia of
members of the other ethnic groups, although the Serb campaign
of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Muslims likely was the
most determined. 2
The fighting in Croatia essentially ended in 1993, except
for a brief period in 1995 when the Croatian armed forces
extended their control over areas held by ethnic Serbs since
1992 . The Dayton Agreements stilled the fighting in Bosnia in
1995. 34 In 1999, new violence was triggered in Kosovo, this time
between the government of the remaining Serb-led FRY and the
35Kosovo ethnic Albanians, when Kosovo similarly sought to
separate.: Here the FRY initiated an extensive campaign of
ethnic cleansing against Albanians living in Kosovo, which
30. Id. There was a brief armed conflict between Yugoslavia and Slovenia at the very
beginning of the wars. Additionally, there has been fighting between the Croat and Muslim
communities. "Muslims" here means persons of the Muslim religion (or of Muslim
religious background, given that Yugoslavia was, for about forty years, ruled by the
officially atheistic Communists) who are ethnically Slavic, as are the Serbs (predominantly
Orthodox Christian in religion or background) and Croats (predominantly Roman Catholic
in religion or background). There are also members of many other ethnic groups who live
or lived in the areas of the conflict. The three major groups and many members of the
others speak what are essentially mutually intelligible dialects of the same language, Serbo-
Croatian, though Serbia uses the Cyrillic alphabet, and Croatia and most Bosnian Muslims
use the Roman alphabet. Especially since the beginning of the wars in 1992, nationalists of
all three groups have portrayed each group as speaking a distinct language.,
31. See Bruun, supra n. 27, at 195.
32. Id. at 200.
33. Paul Watson, Anatomy of Violence in Kosovo, L.A. Times, Al (Dec. 22, 1999).
34. Eric Rosand, The Kosovo Crisis: Implications of the Right to Return, 18 Berk. J.
Intl. L. 229, 239 (2000); see generally Paul C. Szasz, Current Development: The
Protection of Human Rights through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90
Am. J. Intl. L. 301 (Apr. 1996) (an in-depth look at the development of the Dayton
Agreement).
35. Albanians are predominantly Muslim in religious history, with a Christian minority.
(The most famous ethnic Albanian Christian of recent times was Mother Teresa.) They are
not Slavs, and the Albanian language is not Slavic.
36. Rosand, supra n. 34, at 231.
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drew to a close after sustained NATO bombing of the FRY.37
The subsequent repatriation of ethnic Albanians to Kosovo
triggered an exodus of Serbs.38 There is continued instability in
the region, which remains under the tutelage of the United
Nations and NATO peacekeepers. All of these conflicts among
Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians left approximately
200,000 to 250,000 people dead. 9 As of this writing, there is
violence between the government of Macedonia and groups of
ethnic Albanians.
The ICTY was initially designed to prosecute crimes
committed during the wars that began in 1992 "in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia. ' ' 40 However, in its Statute, the
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY is open-ended.4'
Consequently, it can prosecute offenses occurring in conflicts
that arose following its creation, such as the 1999 violence
against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Prosecutor of the ICTY
has rejected Yugoslav calls for investigation of the NATO
bombings in Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis.42
The ICTY is empowered to prosecute four clusters of
offenses, which are set out in its Statute. These include grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,43 violations of the
laws or customs of war" (which together are generally known as
"war crimes"), genocide,45 and crimes against humanity. 46 There
are some important differences in crimes that can be punished
by the ICTY and ICTR, as discussed below. 47 Trials in the ICTY
are held before panels of three judges, a majority vote of whom
37. See Rosand, supra n. 34, at 229; see also Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Intervention:
NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Intl. L. 828, 829 (Oct. 1999).
38. See Rosand, supra n. 34, at 230.
39. Bruun, supra n. 27, at 195.
40. ICTY Stat. art. I (on territorial jurisdiction).
41. ICTY Stat. art. I (power to prosecute crimes "committed... since 1991").
Contrast ICTR Stat. art. 1, discussed infra in Part I(A)(2).
42. ICTY, Press Release PR/P.I.S./510-e, Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing
Campaign <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p51 O-e.htm> (June 13, 2000).
43. ICTY Stat. art. 2. Contrast ICTR Stat. art. 4, discussed infra in I(A)(2).
44. ICTY Stat. art. 3. There is no direct analogue to this in the ICTR Statute.
45. ICTY Stat. art. 4.
46. ICTY Stat. art. 5.
47. See infra Section I(A)(2) and nn. 75-80.
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is necessary to a decision. 8 Originally, there were two Trial
Chambers of three judges each. 49 The number of Trial Chambers
was increased to three in 1998."' As of 2000, up to nine ad litem
judges may be appointed, with up to six of these in any one Trial
Chamber, and trials continue to be heard by panels of three.5'
The ICTY has made'significant progress in investigations,
indictments, judgments, and appeals. At the time of this writing,
the ICTY has forty-eight accused in custody and has
provisionally released one accused.5 2 Thirty-one indictees, some
of whom are subject to international arrest warrants, remain at
large. Many of these indictees are believed to be in the FRY or
Republika Srpska (the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina governed by
the Bosnian Serbs). The arrest and surrender by the FRY
government of accused individuals to the ICTY-along with the
freezing of assets of some accused-remain contentious issues.53
Of course, the most notable indictee is the former president
of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, who was turned over to the
ICTY on June 28, 2001, two years after his indictment in May
1999.14 Milosevic is currently in pre-trial proceedings at the
ICTY. Milosevic's initial 1999 indictment involved crimes
against humanity (including persecution) and war crimes against
48. ICTY Stat. art. 23.
49. ICTY Stat. arts. 11, 12 (art. 12 since amended).
50. S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 166 (1998).
51. S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 4240th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), with
Annexes, amending ICTY Stat. arts. 12-14, and ICTR Stat. arts. 11-13.
52. ICTY, Outstanding Public Indictments <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-
e.htm> (last updated Oct. 2, 2001).
53. See ICTY, Press Release P.I.S./558-E, Statement by Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte,
on the Occasion of Her Visit to Belgrade <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p558-e.htm>
(Jan. 30, 2001); ICTY, Press Release SJP/P.I.S./557-e, Milosevic and Others Case:
Warrants of Arrest Re-Issued to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p557-e.htm> (Jan. 23, 2001).
54. BBC News Online, Milosevic Extradited <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
europe/newsid_1412000/1412828.htm> (June 28, 2001). "Transfer" or "surrender," rather
than "extradition," is the word that in international law correctly describes the process by
which a State delivers an accused to an international criminal tribunal. See Kenneth S.
Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 Crim. L. Forum 557, 558-60 & n. 6
(1994) (relying on ICTY Stat. arts. 19(2), 20(2), 29(2)(e)). "Extradition" generally
describes the process by which a State transfers an accused person to another State.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order I (Sijthoff/Oceana
1974). An international criminal tribunal is not a State.
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ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.55 This indictment has subsequently
been amended twice and now explicitly includes the deportation
of 800,000 Kosovo Albanians, approximately one-third of the
entire Kosovo Albanian population." Milosevic also faces
separate charges of genocide and crimes against humanity
(including persecution and extermination) and war crimes
committed in Croatia against Croats and other non-Serbs during
the Balkan Wars. 7 Other notorious indictees still at large include
former high-ranking officials in the Bosnian Serb government,
such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Assuredly, the
transfer of Milosevic by the Serbian government has caused
tension. The transfer was allegedly contrary to a suspension of
the transfer order issued by the Constitutional Court of the FRY,
and it spawned unsuccessful litigation by Milosevic in the Dutch
courts."' All this raises difficult and complex questions regarding
the role of trials, in particular international trials, in post-
authoritarian political transitions, and the relationship between
international criminal jurisdiction and national law.
Notwithstanding the problematic transfer of certain high-
level indictees, the ICTY's workload is growing quickly.
Assuming all accused are apprehended, it is estimated that their
trials will not be completed before the year 2007.' 9 To this must
be added the time it takes for appeals to be adjudged, given that
nearly all trial convictions are appealed. These estimates do not
include the Prosecutor's intention to open further investigations
into 150 suspects (many related to the Kosovo violence), which
55. See ICTY Prosecutor, IT-99-37, Indictment against Milosevic et al. (May 22,
1999).
56. See ICTY Prosecutor, IT-99-37-1, First Amended Indictment against Milosevic et
al. (June 29, 2001); ICTY Prosecutor, IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment against
Milosevic et al. 'IT 62-63, 106 (Oct. 16, 2001).
57. See ICTY Prosecutor, IT-01-50-1, Indictment against Milosevic T 37, 60-62, 66
(Oct. 8, 2001); ICTY, Press Release X.T./P.I.S./638-E, Judge Richard May Confirms
Indictment Charging Slobodan Milosevic with Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nov.
23, 2001). Milosevic also was arrested on April 1, 2001, by FRY police on allegations of
corruption and abuse of power, not war crimes.
58. See BBC News Online, supra n. 54.
59. ICTY President Judge Claude Jorda, Report on the Operation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 12, 2000) (presented to the U.N.
Security Council on June 20, 2000) (available at <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
RAP000620e.htm>).
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would permit the ICTY to accomplish its mission only by
2016.6° Moreover, in November 2001, the ICTY actively began
to investigate crimes allegedly committed by Macedonian
soldiers against ethnic Albanian civilians and also crimes
allegedly committed by ethnic Albanian militant rebels. 6' Given
these projections, there is a pressing need for the ICTY to
contemplate institutional reform such that it can judiciously
process all actual and potential cases, while respecting tenets of
due process and prompt trial.
In this vein, ICTY President Judge Jorda has suggested a
number of possible reforms. Although many involve expediting
the pre-trial and trial phases, suggested reforms at the appellate
level include the following: (1) creating two new judge
positions; (2) establishing a preliminary screening mechanism to
verify that appeals from judgments of the Trial Chamber satisfy
the grounds for appeal; (3) permitting motions for dismissal in
cases where an appeal would be frivolous; and (4) assigning
judges to either the Appeals Chamber or the Trial Chamber such
that subsequent disqualifications owing to intermingling could
be minimized.62 In the most recent revision of the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes by the Security Council, two judges were added
to the Appeals Chambers and procedures were put in place to
avoid disqualifications due to transfers of judges between
Chambers.63
For 2000, the ICTY's budget was $U.S. 95,942,600. 6' Some
United States judges have sat on the ICTY. In fact, one former
President of the ICTY was an American, Judge Gabrielle Kirk
MacDonald. When Judge MacDonald vacated her position on
the ICTY as well as its Presidency, Patricia Wald (formerly of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit), replaced her as Judge. On March 14, 2001, the United
Nations elected another American, Theodor Meron, as a Judge
60. Id.
61. See The Globe and Mail on-line edition, War Crimes Probe Uncovers Human
Remains (Nov. 25, 2001) (available at <http://www.globeandmail.ca>).
62. Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the International
Criminal Tribunals, 94 Am. J. Intl. L. 759, 768 (2000).
63. S.C. Res. 1329, supra n. 7.
64. ICTY, ICTY Key Figures <hup:llwww.un.org/glancelkeyfig-e.htm> (last updated
Sept. 25, 2001).
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on the ICTY; he took office in November 2001 upon the
expiration of Judge Wald's term.65
2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Rwanda's Hutus attempted to exterminate Rwanda's Tutsis
in the spring and summer of 1994. Approximately 800,000
people (ten percent of the Rwandan national population) were
murdered.66 Hutu and Tutsi had lived closely intermingled in
Rwanda for centuries, with Tutsi comprising about fifteen
percent of the population, the Hutu about eighty-five percent.
61
Although marriage and clan structures often cut across ethnic
lines, several decades of ethnic propaganda, spurred by the
ethnically divisive effects of colonialism, acutely polarized
Hutu-Tutsi relations. 68 Hutu and Tutsi are not limited to the
territories of the Rwandan nation-state; they also live in
neighboring states such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and Uganda.
The Rwandan genocide was carefully planned and
69
methodically orchestrated by an extremist Hutu government.
The mass killings involved very high levels of popular
participation and victimization.70 The only entity that actively
sought to stop the genocide was the Rwandan Patriotic Army
("RPA"). The RPA, largely composed of Tutsi who had
previously fled to Uganda, invaded Rwanda in July 1994 and
eventually ousted the genocidal regime, whose poorly trained
and meagerly equipped armed forces were more interested in
slaughtering Tutsi civilians than fighting any war. By July 1994,
65. ICTY, Press Release CC/P.I.S./577-e, The Fourteen Elected Judges Will Take Up
Office in November (Mar. 15, 2001).
66. G6rard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 261, 264-66 (rev. ed.,
Colum. U. Press 1997).
67. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1221, 1223 n. 3 (2000).
68. Id. at 1243.
69. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with
our Families: Stories from Rwanda 95 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998).
70. See Drumbl, supra n. 67, at 1245-52.
APPEALS IN THE AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 605
a new regime led by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic
Front (" RPF" ) took over power, where it remains to this date.'
The ICTR, established late in 1994 by Security Council
Resolution 955, is mandated to prosecute those responsible for
the genocide. Separately from the ICTR proceedings, the
Rwandan government has initiated its own national genocide
trials and has incarcerated approximately 125,000 suspects
pending trial.72 As of August 21, 2001, there are forty-five
detainees at the ICTR.73 The ICTR has been much more
successful than the ICTY in obtaining custody over its indictees;
this is largely due to the cooperation accorded the ICTR by
many African countries, as well as France and Belgium, to
which many of the indictees fled shortly after the RPA takeover
of Rwanda. The ICTR has definitely convicted six individuals
and has acquitted one individual 4
The Statute of the ICTR is similar to that of the ICTY,
although there are some important differences in jurisdiction.
The ICTR's jurisdiction is time-limited, applying only to crimes
committed during 1994. 7s It may prosecute a somewhat different
set of crimes than the ICTY. The crimes that can be prosecuted
in the ICTR include genocide,76 crimes against humanity,7 and
"serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims, and Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977."78
71. Id. at 1224.
72. Id. at 1233.
73. See ICTR, ICTR Detainees-Status of21 August 2001 <http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISHfactsheets.detainee.htm> (accessed Sept. 4, 2001).
74. See id.
75. ICTR Stat. art. 1.
76. ICTR Stat. art. 2 (defined as in ICTY Stat. art. 4). Like the ICTY, the ICTR can
prosecute conspiracy to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and direct and
public incitement to commit genocide. See ICTR Stat. arts. 2, 4; ICTY Stat. art. 4. The
ICTR currently is prosecuting a series of individuals who used the public media to incite
genocide. These cases raise the issue of the boundary between the prosecution of acts
leading to genocide and international human rights law protecting freedom of expression.
77. ICTR Stat. art. 3 (defined to include the same acts (such as murder, enslavement,
torture and rape) as in ICTY Stat. art. 5). The ICTR Statute, however, prohibits these acts
"when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." The ICTY Statute
prohibits these acts "in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character."
78. ICTR Stat. art. 4.
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Of note is the inclusion of only a part of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 applying specifically to "armed conflict
not of an international character,"7 9 and the addition of a
Protocol further protecting victims of such conflicts. This
language recognized that the war in Rwanda was principally an
internal matter, whereas the Balkan Wars had both internal and
international characteristics. It also recognized that the
acceptance of the Protocol by Rwanda before 1994 meant that
its protections could be applied to its nationals and individuals
committing crimes on its soil, even though all of the protections
have not necessarily become customary international law, which
applies to all nations. °
The ICTR has three three-judge Trial Chambers, with
decisions made by a majority vote of the members of the
Chamber hearing the matter.8' Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR has
not been given the authority to appoint judges ad litem, because
it did not seek such authority until very recently-July 2001.
The General Assembly provided the ICTR with over $U.S.
75 million for its 1999 budget.82
B. The Appeals Chambers in the Tribunals' Statutes
As mentioned above, the two Tribunals have separate
Appeals Chambers with common members. Currently, there are
seven members of the Appeals Chambers, five of whom sit on
each appeal. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes have always spoken
of an Appeals Chamber for each Tribunal. The Rules of
Procedure are somewhat different for each, as will be discussed
79. Geneva Conventions (Nos. l-IV) (for the Protection of War Victims) (Aug. 12,
1949) (available at <http://www.icrc.org>).
80. Cf. Secretary-General's Rep., supra n. 1, at 35 (not listing the Protocol as within
those treaties that have "without doubt become part of international customary law").
"International customary law" (or "customary international law") is one of the
fundamental sources of international law. It is essentially that body of the general
international practice of nations that is accepted as legally binding by them. See e.g. ICI
Stat. art. 38(l)(b).
81. Compare ICTR Stat. arts. 11-13 (all later amended) & 22 with ICTY Stat. arts. 12-
14 (all later amended) & 23.
82. U.N., Press Release GA/9652, Assembly Appraises Progress Made By War Crimes
Tribunals; Judges Describe Obstacles <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19991108.ga9652.doc.html> (Nov. 8, 1999).
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below. When they discuss or cite cases in their opinions, the
judges regularly note from which Appeals Chamber a case has
come.
The identity of judges in both Tribunals' Appeals
Chambers creates an important linkage between them. The
purpose of this linkage is clear: consistency in the interpretation
and development of international criminal law and procedure.
The recent addition to the Appeals Chambers of judges
originally assigned to the ICTR emphasizes the importance of
the crimes within the jurisdiction of each Tribunal. This linkage
of two international courts through Appeals Chambers with
common members is highly unusual in international practice.
Most international tribunals are independent of each other, even
where they deal with similar subject matters." The linkage was
politically possible because the two tribunals were created by a
single international organization, the United Nations, acting
through the Security Council.
The original ICTY Statute provided for an Appeals
Chamber of five members, to sit only in that Chamber. The
mandate of the Appeals Chamber is to hear appeals from
persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor.
The grounds for appeal are limited to correcting "an error on a
question of law invalidating the decision" or "an error of fact
which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice."85 The ICTY
Appeals Chamber may "affirm, reverse or revise" a decision of
the Trial Chamber.86 Note that this language authorizes
83. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court
of Human Rights are wholly independent institutions dealing with protection of individual
rights under regional treaties. The International Court of Justice, based in The Hague, is
independent of the Tribunals and will also be independent of the International Criminal
Court. Dispute resolution mechanisms under regional trade agreements (for example, the
NAFTA) can also operate independently from dispute resolution under global trade
agreements (for example, the World Trade Organization). The independence and
separateness of various international tribunals in a context of potential jurisdictional
overlap is a potential problem for international law. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-2 I-A,
Appeals Judgement 1[ 10-26 (ICTY App. Chamber Feb. 20, 2001).
84. ICTY Stat. arts. 12, 14 (both later amended).
85. Id. at art. 25. For further discussion of scope and standards of review, see infra Part
I(D).
86. Id. For discussion of ordering new trials or sentencing proceedings, see infra Part
I(D)(I).
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Prosecutorial appeals of acquittals, a practice that exists in many
common and civil law nations, but that is prohibited in the
United States by its understanding of double jeopardy.87 When
the ICTR Statute was implemented, a similar structure was
adopted, with the same grounds for appeal and authority to
"affirm, reverse or revise" Trial Chamber decisions.8 Members
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber were designated to serve as "the
members of the Appeals Chamber of the [ICTR].,,8 9 The
Prosecutor for the ICTY also serves as the ICTR Prosecutor.90
In the year 2000, the sizes of both the ICTY and ICTR
were increased, and this increase extended to each Appeals
Chamber. Each Appeals Chamber now consists of the same
seven members, five of whom sit on the panel for any appeal. 9'
The President of the ICTR assigns two judges to the Appeals
Chamber. 92 The President of the ICTY assigns four members of
the Appeals Chamber, and the President of the ICTY is a
member of, and presides over, the Appeals Chamber.93
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes leave open many questions
concerning appellate practice and procedure. Among the most
basic is whether the Tribunals will bind themselves by stare
decisis and follow precedent like common law courts, or
whether they will take more of a civil law approach.94
Additionally, as will be seen, Rules adopted by the Tribunals
have stretched the wording of the Statutes in allowing some
87. U.S. Const. amend. V. Although the Prosecutor is allowed to appeal acquittals, both
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes protect against double punishment or double trial (i.e., by both
national Courts and the International Tribunal) under the rubric of Non-bis-in-idem. ICTY
Stat. art. 10; ICTR Stat. art. 9. See also infra nn. 252-54 and accompanying text,
(discussing the Review process in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, and its relationship to the
principle that no one should be retried for an offense for which there has been a final
acquittal). The Prosecutor has appealed from acquittals on several occasions.
88. ICTR Stat. arts. 1I, 12, 13 (all later amended) & 24.
89. Id. at art. 12(2) (later amended).
90. Id. at Stat. art. 15.
91. ICTY Stat. art. 12(3), as amended; ICTR Stat. art. I I(b), as amended.
92. ICTR Stat. art. 13 (3 & 4), as amended; ICTY Stat. art. 14(4), as amended. The
ICTR President is chosen by the ICTR judges and becomes a member of one of the ICTR
Trial Chambers. ICTR Stat. art. 13 (1 & 2), as amended.
93. ICTY Stat. art. 14 (2 & 3), as amended. The ICTY President is chosen by the ICTY
Judges from among themselves. ICTY Stat. art. 14(l), as amended.
94. See supra n. 9 and accompanying text and infra Part I(D)(4) (discussing the general
acceptance of precedent in the Tribunals' decisionmaking).
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interlocutory appeals and in allowing appeals by States (i.e.,
nation-states) in some matters. 95 One question that the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes do not leave open, however, is that of the
independence and impartiality of the judges, which are
guaranteed.96 This judicial independence should not obscure the
fact that the work of both tribunals, as well as the
implementation of indictments, is heavily contingent upon the
cooperation of all nation-states, in particular Rwanda, Croatia,
Bosnia, and the FRY.
C. The Appellate Process in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence
The ICTY Statute requires the ICTY to make Rules of
Procedure and Evidence concerning the following: pre-trial,
trial, and appellate proceedings; "admission of evidence;
protection of victims and witnesses; and other appropriate
matters." 97 These Rules were promptly promulgated and have
since been revised many times.99 The ICTR Statute requires the
ICTR judges to adopt the ICTY Rules "with such changes as
they deem necessary." 99 This adoption was also done promptly,
and revisions have been ongoing.'0 The ICTR Rules authorize
95. These interlocutory appeals are covered infra Part I (C)(2).
96. ICTY, Press Release JD/P.I.S./540-e, Speech by His Excellency, Judge Claude
Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the
U.N. General Assembly <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p540-e.htm> (Nov. 20, 2000).
97. ICTY Stat. art. 15.
98. The most recent full version is Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/REV.21 (as
amended July 12, 2001) [hereinafter ICTY R. P. & Evid.]. Additional revisions, the
twenty-first set, were made by the Tribunal on July 19, 2001, effective July 26, 2001, in an
order signed by Judge Richard May. (These revisions are ambiguously designated on the
ICTY website as being dated July 16 or July 19, and they do not carry a U.N. document
number.) The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence were originally adopted February
11, 1994, IT/32. The April 2001 full version and the July amendments, as well as some
prior versions, are on the ICTY web site, <http://www.un.org/icty>. This web site contains
a great deal of the case law of the ICTY as well as the Statute, Rules, and other basic legal
documents of the Tribunal. Early versions of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
are reprinted as "Appendix C" in A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 Crim. L. Forum 651 (1994).
99. ICTR Stat. art. 14.
100. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (as amended May 30-31, 2001) [hereinafter
ICTR R. P. & Evid.] is the most recent version. The current version, as well as some prior
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the Appeals Chamber to issue Practice Directions that are more
specific than the Rules for appeals.'0 ' The ICTR Registrar's
Office, the administrative arm of the Tribunal, should be
consulted about whether such Directives have been issued.
Concerning appeals, the two Tribunals' rules are similar,
but they have many differences in the details. These differences
arise partly from differing needs of the Tribunals. They may also
arise simply from the promulgation of Rules for each Tribunal
by its own body of judges. There is no requirement of common
Rules on appeal or elsewhere in the process. The basic appellate
process will be familiar to most lawyers. Interlocutory and
special proceedings also exist.
1. Appeals from Final Judgments: The Basic Appellate Process
After judgment or sentence, the aggrieved party has fifteen
days to file a notice of appeal in the ICTY, thirty days in the
ICTR. O2 Either the defense or the prosecution may appeal,
unlike in the United States, where the prosecution may not
appeal an acquittal.' 3 In the ICTR only, the notice of appeal
must set out the grounds for appeal.'04 The Record on Appeal
consists of the entire trial record in the ICTY, but in the ICTR, it
consists only of those parts of the trial record designated by the
versions, is on the ICTR web site, <http://www.ictr.org>. This web site also contains case
law of the ICTR as well as its basic legal documents. The ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence were originally adopted June 29, 1995, and do not carry a UN document number.
101. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 107 bis.
102. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 108; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 108(A). No reason is given for the
different times for appeal. The greater difficulty of communications among the relevant
persons and offices involved in ICTR proceedings (especially the separation of the Trial
Chambers in Arusha, Tanzania and the Appeals Chamber, operating from the ICTY seat in
The Hague, Netherl nds) may account for the difference. Additionally, the judges who
adopted the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence are different from those who adopted
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. There is little coordination between the two
Tribunals when it comes to rule adoption and amendments.
103. See supra n. 87 and accompanying text. In other common law countries, for
example, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the prosecution can in
certain cases appeal on questions of iaw. See also Fleming, supra n. 28.
104. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 108(A). The reason the grounds must be stated in the notice of
appeal in the ICTR is so that the parties can determine which parts of the record will need
to be certified for appeal and included in the Appeal Book.
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parties.' 5 In both Tribunals, the Registrar makes a sufficient
number of copies of the record on appeal for the judges of the
Appeals Chamber and the parties.0 6
Written briefing follows a schedule similar to that in many
jurisdictions. In both Tribunals, the appellant has ninety days
from filing the notice of appeal to file a brief with argument and
authorities; in the ICTY the brief must also contain the grounds
for appeal." 7 In both Tribunals, the respondent's brief with
arguments and authorities must be filed within thirty days of the
filing of the appellant's brief.' 8 In both Tribunals, the appellant
may file a reply brief within fifteen days of the filing of the
respondent's brief. The Appeals Chamber may extend these time
limits on a showing of good cause. This power to extend the
time limits is explicit in the ICTR Rules.' °9 In the ICTY Rules, it
must be inferred from the Rules governing Trial Chamber
proceedings, which apply "mutatis mutandis to proceedings in
the Appeals Chamber."" ° Because the Trial Chambers may
extend time periods for good cause, so too can the Appeals
Chamber."' Complying with time limits is nonetheless vital. The
ICTR Appeals Chamber recently dismissed a Prosecution appeal
for failure to file its brief timely."2
105. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 109; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 109. It is clearer here that the reason
for the difference is the problem of transporting a voluminous record, including evidence,
from Arusha to The Hague. See ICTR R. P. & Evid. 109(G). The ICTR Appeals Chamber
may call for the whole record, and a party may ask the Appeals Chamber for leave to
designate additional portions of the trial record that it did not originally request be made
part of the record on appeal. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 109 (E) & (F).
106. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 110; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 110.
107. ICTY R. P.& Evid. 111; ICTR R. P. &Evid. I11.
108. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 112; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 112.
109. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 116.
110. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 107.
111. Id. at 127. For example, the ICTY has allowed time for filing a brief to run from the
time of receipt by counsel of a translation of the Trial Chamber's decision into Serbo-
Croatian. John R.W.D. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 450 (2d ed., Transnational Pubs. 2000) (discussing
Erdemovic v. Prosecutor, IT-96-22-A (Order of Cassese, P.J.)). (The version of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence that Jones commented upon is IT/32/REV.14 (Dec. 17,
1998 & Feb. 25, 1999); the version of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence
commented upon is that of June 8, 1998. The commentary is often very useful even if there
have been later changes in the text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for which
practitioners should always check.)
112. See Le Procureur c/ Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-A (ICTR App. Chamber June 1, 2001).
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The ICTY Rules require that the Appeals Chamber set a
date for hearing of the appeal.' 3 The ICTR Rules give the
Appeals Chamber the option of either setting a date for hearing
or deciding the appeal on the written briefs. 114 A new ICTR Rule
requires that each party present its own "Appeal Book,"
containing all documents and materials (or relevant excerpts)
from cases cited in its briefs or referred to in oral argument.
Each party must also file its own "Book of Authorities," with
the text or relevant excerpts from "every reference material,
including case law, statutory and regulatory provisions, from
international and national sources" to which it refers in its briefs
or intends to refer to in oral argument. These materials must be
filed with the Registry two weeks before the hearing. "'
The Rules of both Tribunals allow the presentation of
additional evidence on appeal if the evidence was not available
to the proffering party at trial and if the request for presentation
is made not fewer than fifteen days before the hearing on the
appeal. The Appeals Chamber has the discretion to authorize
presentation of the evidence if "the interests of justice so
require." '6
The Appeals Chambers of both the ICTY and ICTR
pronounce judgment based on the record on appeal and on any
additional evidence that may have been presented. Judgment
must be reached by a majority of the Judges, and it must be
accompanied or followed by a "reasoned opinion in writing,"
with any concurring or dissenting opinions appended."7
Judgment must be pronounced in public, and the parties and
counsel have the right to be present. ' Enforcement of the
judgment is immediate. ' 9 Note that the Rules of both Tribunals
allow the Appeals Chamber to order a retrial, even though the
113. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 114.
114. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 114, as amended. Earlier versions of the Rule were similar to
ICTY R. P. & Evid. 114. See Jones, supra n. I 1l, at 639. The reason for this difference is
likely the expense of traveling from Arusha to The Hague.
115. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 117 bis. Cf Jones, supra n. 11, at 639-40 (an early version of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence without this provision).
116. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 115; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 115. See infra Part I(D)(2)(b).
117. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 117(B); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 118(B).
118. ICTY R. P. &Evid. 117; ICTRR. P. & Evid. 118.
119. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 118; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 119.
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Statutes on their face only authorize the Appeals Chambers to
affirm, reverse, or revise judgments of the Trial Chambers.120
The Tribunals' Statutes and Rules do not explicitly provide
for reconsideration of their Appeals Chambers' final judgments.
At least Judge Shahabuddeen of the ICTR Appeals Chamber
believes that there is an inherent power of reconsideration in
courts of last resort. 2' Additionally, the Tribunals' Statutes and
Rules provide for post-appellate review proceedings.'22
2. Interlocutory Appeals by Parties and States
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes do not explicitly provide for
interlocutory appeals.' 23 Nonetheless, both Tribunals' Rules of
Procedure and Evidence have allowed for certain interlocutory
appeals from the beginning.124 The ICTY allows for a greater
variety of interlocutory appeals than does the ICTR, where such
appeals are limited to matters of jurisdiction and pretrial release.
The principal interlocutory decisions that may be appealed
as a matter of right by the parties are, in both Tribunals, appeals
from the denial of a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.21
These appealable decisions are defined further as claims that the
indictment does not relate to the persons, places, times, or
crimes defined as falling within the ambit of the Statutes."' A
panel of three Judges of the Appeals Chamber may decide
whether the claim is truly jurisdictional in this sense before the
Chamber hears the appeal.' 27 Essentially, these are defense
120. Compare ICTY R. P. & Evid. 117(C) and ICTR R. P. & Evid. 118(C) with ICTY
Stat. art. 25 and ICTR Stat. art. 24.
121. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision: Prosecutor's Request for
Review or Reconsideration (ICTR App. Chamber Mar. 31, 2000) (separate opinion of
Shahabuddeen, J.).
122. See infra Part I(E) on Review Proceedings in ICTY Stat. art. 26; ICTR Stat. art. 25;
ICTY R. P. & Evid. 119; & ICTR R. P. & Evid. 120.
123. ICTY Stat. art. 25; ICTR Stat. art. 24.
124. See Jones, supra n. 111, at 364-65 (discussing Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I-A,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY App.
Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) (ruling on merits of interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction of the
ICTY)). This was the first major decision of the Appeals Chamber).
125. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 72(B); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 72(D).
126. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 72(D); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 72(H).
127. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 72 (B, D & E) (citing ICTY Stat. arts. 1-9); ICTR R. P. &
Evid. 72 (D, H & I) (citing ICTR Stat. arts. 1-8).
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appeals, as the prosecution would have no reason to appeal the
denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment.
The Rules of both Tribunals allow for appeal of
interlocutory decisions on whether to provisionally release an
accused pending appeal of the trial decision. A three-judge
bench of the appropriate Appeals Chamber must grant
permission for the appeal.' 28 Requests for permission must be
made within seven days of the impugned decision in both
Tribunals, except that, in the ICTY only, the Prosecutor must
file the appeal within one day if the ICTY Trial Chamber grants
a provisional release.'29 The Appeals Chamber has the authority
to suspend the execution of the impugned decision at any stage
of the appeal. " The "party upon whose motion the Trial
Chamber issued the impugned decision" (i.e., the prosecutor or
defense, as the case may be) has a right to be heard by the
Appeals Chamber; "[t]he other party may be heard if the
Appeals Chamber [decides] the interests of justice so require." 3'
Since mid-1997, the ICTY Rules have allowed for a State's
immediate appeal of an interlocutory decision that directly
affects it "if that decision concerns issues of general importance
relating to the powers of the Tribunal." 32 State appeals are not
expressly provided for in the ICTY Statute, and the Rule does
not apply to others who may be affected by an interlocutory
order of a Trial Chamber.'33 This provision was designed to
respond to States' concerns that emerged from the ruins of the
former Yugoslavia that orders of the ICTY were requiring them
or their current and former officials to produce evidence that
128. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 65 (D, E & F); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 65 (D).
129. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 65 (D, E & F); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 65(D). Presumably, the
reference to filing an appeal in one day in ICTY Rule 65(F) means filling an application for
leave to appeal in the sense of Rule 65(D).
130. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 108 bis (C).
131. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 108 bis (B). Note that this structure allows for litigation in a
criminal case pitting a State (i.e., a nation-state) directly against an individual in a tribunal
established by an international organization, the United Nations. See also ICTY R. P. &
Evid. 54 bis (procedure in these matters before appeal). The implications of this innovation
for the role of international organizations and the international legal standing of individuals
are great, but too complex to be discussed in full here.
132. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 108 his, discussed in Jones, supra n. 11, at 448.
133. See ICTY Stat. art. 25 (allowing only appeals by parties-i.e., the Prosecutor and
the Accused).
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might endanger their national security. 3 4 There is no explicit
authority for rejecting an interlocutory appeal from a State on
the grounds that it is not directly affected by a decision or that
the issues concerned are not of general importance to the powers
of the Tribunal. Unlike interlocutory appeals on procedure by
the parties, appeals by States are heard as a matter of right by
full five-judge panels of the ICTY Appeals Chamber."' There is
no similar provision for State interlocutory appeals in the ICTR
Rules, presumably because the political and security issues
among Rwanda and its neighbors are significantly different from
those among the States of the former Yugoslavia.
To balance this right of appeal by States, the ICTY Rules
have recently been amended to allow an interlocutory appeal by
a party-either the prosecutor or the defense-where a motion
to require a State to produce documents is denied.'36 It is not
wholly clear whether this is an interlocutory appeal as a matter
of right. It would seem so from the rule authorizing the appeal
because it does not require leave to appeal, but the general rule
on interlocutory appeals of motions in the Trial Chamber would
require leave to appeal for this motion.'37 The canon of
interpretation that specific provisions control the general would
suggest that parties have such an appeal as a matter of right, but
the Appeals Chamber has the authority to accept or reject this
interpretation.
The ICTY Rules allow for other interlocutory appeals by
permission of a three-judge bench of the Appeals Chamber. The
rule for interlocutory appeal of preliminary motions on
assignment of counsel, severance of counts of indictments or of
trials of co-accused, or form of indictments requires "good
134. See ICTY R. P. & Evid. 54 bis (F) (allowing State to object in Trial Chamber to
request for order to produce documents on grounds of national security); Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, IT-95-14, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of
Decision (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 29, 1997).
135. See ICTY R. P. & Evid. 108 his (B).
136. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 54 bis(C).
137. Compare ICTY R. P. & Evid. 54 bis (C) (stating rejection of application "shall be
subject to appeal," which appears to make it appearing to be as a matter of right) with
ICTY R. P. & Evid. 73(D) (requiring leave to appeal unless motion is jurisdictional or has
been certified by Trial Chamber). See also ICTY R. P. & Evid. 65(D-F) (on pre-trial
release of detainees; similar language to Rule 54 bis(C) except leave to appeal is
specifically required).
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cause"; interlocutory appeals of other motions require either
prejudice to a party not curable by later appeal or an issue of
general importance to the Tribunal or international law more
generally. A person who is not a party (e.g., a witness who is
not an accused) may not file such an appeal. There is, perhaps
surprisingly, currently no analogous rule for such appeals in the
ICTR. 4 0
The ICTY Rules also provide for another avenue of
interlocutory appeal by the parties. An appeal may be mad on
evidentiary or procedural matters during trial if the Trial
Chamber certifies that such an appeal is "appropriate for the
continuation of the trial." 141 In that case, leave of the Appeals
Chamber is not necessary. 43 Again, there is no similar ICTR
provision.
In all cases of interlocutory appeals in both Tribunals, the
process is expedited. The time for filing the notice of appeal of
an interlocutory decision varies. For jurisdictional issues and
State appeals in the ICTY, it is fifteen days. 43 Notices for other
interlocutory appeals must be filed within seven days.'" Where
the ICTY states that a written decision will follow an oral ruling,
time runs from the filing of the written decision, or if the party
and counsel are not present when an oral decision is made, time
runs from receipt of the oral decision. 41 In the ICTR,
138. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 72(B) (interlocutory appeals of preliminary motions require
good cause be shown); ICTY R. P. & Evid. 73(D) (interlocutory appeals from other
motions require prejudice to a party that could not be cured by appeal after final
judgement, or general importance of an issue to Tribunal proceedings or international law
generally). Decisions on whether to allow interlocutory appeals are decided by the Appeals
Chamber without oral hearing. Jones, supra n. 11, at 366.
139. Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I-T, In the Case of Dragan Opacic: Decision on
Application for Leave to Appeal (ICTY App. Chamber June 3, 1997) (three-judge bench)
(Note: Dragan Opacic's case was given its own case number, IT-95-7-Misc. 1; however it
can be found on the ICTY web site under the parent case of Prosecutor v. Tadic).
140. Interlocutory appeal of decisions on most motions is prohibited by ICTR R. P. &
Evid. 72(B), 73(D).
.141. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 73(C).
142. Id.
143. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 72 (B & C) (jurisdiction) & 108 (appeal by State). In the case
of a State, the document to be filed is called a "request for review" rather than a notice of
appeal.
144. Id. at 72(C), 73(E).
145. Id. at 72(C), 73(E).
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interlocutory appeals must generally be filed within seven days.
An extension for more than seven days from the receipt of the
full decision on jurisdiction may be granted, especially if
counsel is not fluent in the language in which the full decision is
initially written.
16
After the notice of appeal, interlocutory appeals in both
Tribunals are to be heard on an expedited basis. The usual time
limits do not apply. The Presiding Judge of the Appeals
Chamber sets the schedule. Interlocutory appeals may be
decided wholly on the basis of the written briefs, without oral
argument, but oral argument may be scheduled by the Appeals
Chamber. Finally, the parties and counsel do not have the right
to be present when judgment is pronounced on interlocutory
appeals. 141
3. Special Appeals: Contempt and False Testimony
The Tribunals may punish contempt of court and false
testimony, ancillary to their power to conduct trials.'
48
Conviction and penalties for these crimes may be appealed.
49
The procedures to be applied in these appeals are the expedited
procedures applied to interlocutory appeals. 50
146. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 108.
147. For all the material in this paragraph, see ICTY R. P. & Evid. 116 bis (and Rules
cited therein) and ICTR R. P. & Evid. 117 (and Rules cited therein). Unlike the ICTR Rule,
the ICTY Rule does not specifically state that it is the presiding judge who controls
scheduling, but it can be inferred that the presiding judge does so in consultation with the
rest of the Appeals Chamber. Compare ICTR R. P. & Evid. 117(B) (explicit authority in
presiding judge) with ICTY R. P. & Evid. 116 bis (C) (presiding judge, in consultation with
other members of Appeals Chamber, decides whether parties and counsel should have
opportunity to be present when judgment is rendered on an appeal).
148. See Jones, supra n. I 11, at 393-95 (contempt power as prerogative of the
appropriate Chamber) & at 627-28 (nature of crime of false testimony). The Statutes of the
Tribunals do not explicitly authorize convictions for these crimes.
149. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 77 (contempt) & 91 (false testimony under solemn
declaration); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 77 & 91 (same rubrics as ICTY). See Prosecutor v. Tadic
(Appeal of Vujin), IT-94- I -A-AR77 (ICTY App. Chamber Feb. 27, 2001) (contempt may
be appealed, even when initially found by Appeals Chamber), discussed further infra Part
II(A)(4).
150. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 116 bis; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 117; see supra n. 147 and
accompanying text.
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D. Practice on Appeal: Grounds for Appeal, Standards of
Review, Preservation of Issues, and Use of Precedent
1. Grounds for Appeal and Available Remedies
The general scope of the Appeals Chambers' review, at
least in cases of final judgments, 5 is set forth in their Statutes:
1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons'
convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on
the following grounds:
a) An error on a question of law invalidating the
decision; or
b) An error of fact which has occasioned a
miscarriage of justice.
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the
decisions taken by the Trial Chambers.
5 2
Where two grounds are raised, the Appeals Chamber may decide
to review both of them, even though, strictly speaking, it could
dispose of the entire case based on only one of them. '3
The ICTY Appeals Chamber very recently has reiterated
that there is a third class of grounds for appeal:'5 4 "the
exceptional situation where a party has raised a legal issue that
151. The scope of review for interlocutory appeals is defined by the limits on what may
be appealed and is discussed supra part I(C)(2). For special matters, discussed supra part
I(C)(3), if the Appeals Chamber is reviewing either its own action or the action of a Trial
Chamber, there is no case law or other evidence that suggests it will apply different
standards of review from that applied to normal final judgments. However, experience in
these matters has been very limited. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Appeal of Nobilo), IT-
95-4/I-AR77, Judgment on Appeal (ICTY App. Chamber May 30, 2001); Prosecutor v.
Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94-I-A-AR77 (ICTY App. Chamber Feb. 27, 2001) (both
contempt of court proceedings involving unprofessional conduct of counsel).
152. ICTY Stat. art. 25; ICTR Stat. art. 24.
153. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 125 (ICTY App.
Chamber Oct. 23, 2001) (Appeals Chamber decided issue of vagueness of indictment, even
though issue of sufficiency of evidence wholly disposed of case).
154. This is in addition to the two set forth in ICTY Statute, article 25(l)(a) & (b). The
same considerations would appear to apply to ICTR Statute, article 24(l)(a) & (b).
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is of general significance to the Tribunal's jurisprudence." ,' For
example, in Tadic the Appeals Chamber determined both that a
crime against humanity may be committed out of a purely
personal motive and that the Trial Chamber has discretion to
require the defense to disclose prior statements made by its
witnesses. Yet neither party contended that the convictions
would stand or fall on either of these issues. 156 Such an issue
might be raised (as it was in Tadic) by the prosecution in a
cross-appeal seeking review of a legal ruling by the Trial
Chamber at the same time that the Appeals Chamber hears a
defense appeal against conviction.
The Rules of both Tribunals allow their respective Appeals
Chambers to order retrials," 7 as well as to "affirm, reverse or
revise" Trial Chamber decisions.'58 The Appeals Chamber has
held that this includes the authority to refer a matter back for re-
sentencing.5 9 There is some discretion available to the Appeals
Chambers in considering whether to order a retrial. For example,
the ICTY Appeals Chamber has refused to order a retrial
following a successful prosecutorial appeal of an acquittal for
insufficient evidence. In Jelisic, factors such as the accused's
guilty pleas on other charges as well as his need for psychiatric
treatment that was more readily available in prison than in the
Tribunal's detention center led the Chamber to conclude that a
retrial would not be in the interests of justice. '6°
155. Kupreskic, 22 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A T 247 (ICTY App.
Chamber July 15, 1999)]; accord Procureur c/Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Arrt [Judgement]
118 (ICTR App. Chamber June 1, 2001).
156. Tadic, 9191 238-72, 9191 306-326 (ICTY App. Chamber July 15, 1999).
157. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 117(C) (accused may be "retried according to law"); ICTR R.
P. & Evid. 118(C) (accused may be "retried before the Trial Chamber"); Kupreskic, 91 125;
Jelisic, 11 73-77.
158. ICTY Stat. art. 25(l); ICTR Stat. art. 24(1).
159. Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-2 I-A, Appeal Judgement 91 851 (ICTY App. Chamber
Feb. 20, 2001).
160. Jelisic, 9191 73-77.
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2. Standards of Review
On October 23, 2001, in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,'6' the
ICTY Appeals Chamber restated, and to some extent reshaped,
the law concerning standards of review on appeal, especially
with -regard to errors of fact and admission of new evidence on
appeal. Counsel in both the ICTY and ICTR should be aware
that the law may remain in flux for some time and that new
developments are ongoing in this area of the law.
In their major statements on standards of review, 62 the
Appeals Chambers have generally classified grounds for appeal
into two categories: errors of law or errors of fact. They
generally do not refer to mixed questions of law and fact, a
classification often used in common law appellate courts to
discuss issues such as negligence.' 63 There appear to be two
reasons for this. First, the Statutes of both Tribunals refer only to
''an error on a question of law" or "an error of fact," not to
mixed questions.' The second is the requirement that a
judgment of a Trial Chamber be "accompanied by a reasoned
opinion in writing." ,61 In such an opinion, the Trial Chamber
might be expected to state the standards of law it is applying as
well as the facts to which it finds the standards applicable-each
of which may be reviewed by the Appeals Chamber.'
66
If a standard of law is correct, the alleged misapplication of
that standard to the facts of a specific case appears to be treated
as an error of fact.' 67 An error of fact causes a miscarriage of
161. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 23, 2001). See also
Musema cl Le Procureur, ICTR-96-13-A, Arr6t, [ 399 (ICTR App. Chamber Nov. 16,
2001) (holding converse of Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber did not remand for re-
sentencing where defense appeal upheld as to one charge, where facts of remaining case
necessitated sentence given). Note: Musema was decided after completion of the primary
research for this article. Notes to it have been added where feasible.
162. Kupreskic; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17-A, Appeal Judgement (ICTY App.
Chamber July 21, 2000); Serushago v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment
(ICTR App. Chamber Apr. 6, 2000) (discussed further infra part I (B)(1)); see also Tadic,
IT-94- I-A, Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber July 15, 1999).
163. Fleming, supra n. 28, at 124.
164. ICTY Stat. art. 25; ICTR Stat. art. 24.
165. ICTY Stat. art. 23; ICTR Stat. art. 22.
166. See Furundzija, T 37 (relying on Serushago, 22).
167. Id. at 1 37 (relying on Serushago, 22); see Le Procureur ci Kayishema, ICTR-95-
I-A, [[ 135-47 (ICTR App. Chamber June I, 2001) (discussed further infra part 11 (B)(5));
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justice where, for example, an accused "is convicted despite a
lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime."'
68
Similarly, the Appeals Chambers have distinguished between
alleged errors of law in defining what mitigating circumstances
apply in sentencing proceedings and alleged errors of fact
concerning how much weight to give each circumstance. ,69This
class of factual error is encompassed by the phrase "error of
fact," which ordinarily means a mistake as to what happened." 0
In sentencing appeals, however, counsel should be aware
that the Appeals Chambers often use a different formulation.
The inquiry is whether the Trial Chamber committed
"discernable error" in exercising its discretion in sentencing.
17 1
The Appeals Chamber particularly applies this standard to
determine whether the sentence was consistent with sentences
handed out in similar cases in the Tribunals and whether the
sentence was within the "discretionary framework" available to
the sentencer 1
72
Fleming, supra n. 28 (noting that this is the sort of question often referred to in domestic
systems as a mixed question of law and fact) (relying on e.g. Dir. of Investigation &
Research v. Southam Inc., I S.C.R. 748, 766-67 (S. Ct. Can. 1997); U.S. v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 512 (1995)).
168. Furundzija, T1 37 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (defining
"miscarriage of justice")); followed in Kupreskic, 91 29; Kayishema, 9191 135-49 (issues of
sufficiency of evidence of genocide and accused's mens rea treated as factual issues).
Accord Delalic, 434-37, 9191 438-507 (treating issue of sufficiency on appeal as factual;
distinguishing issue of "legal" sufficiency of evidence to continue with trial at the close of
the Prosecution's case).
169. Furundzija, 91 37 (relying on Serushago, 122).
170. See Kupreskic, 9191 126-232 (reversing a finding that an accused participated in a
particular attack); 1 304 (pointing out what appear to be both types of factual error: errors
as to whether accused was a member of a police force and whether troops were at his house
on a given day; and an error as to whether a reasonable tribunal of fact could find the
accused guilty as an aider and abettor on the evidence; these errors led to a "miscarriage of
justice" ).
171. Kupreskic, 91 408; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgement 91 187 (ICTY
App. Chamber Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A and IT-94-l-Abis,
Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, 91 22 (ICTY App. Chamber Jan. 26, 2000).
172. See Kupreskic, 91 408; Aleksovski, 91 187; Kayishema, 91 337 ("pouvoir
discr6tionnaire" in the authoritative French version, translated by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in the later cases as "discretionary framework"); Tadic, Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, 91 22.
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a. Errors of Law
An appellant claiming an error of law "must at least
identify the alleged error and advance some arguments in
support of its contention." ' The Appeals Chamber does not,
however, limit itself to the precise arguments raised by an
appellant. If the argument raised in support of a claim of error
does not support the claim, the party raising the claim
has not failed to discharge a burden in the sense that a
person who fails to discharge a burden automatically loses
his point. The Appeals Chamber may step in and, for other
reasons, find in favour of the contention that there is an
error of law.'
The Appeals Chamber thus makes a distinction between issues
or grounds for appeal that must be asserted and the arguments
that may be adduced in favor of those grounds, which the
Appeals Chamber may shape as appropriate.
The Appeals Chambers freely review questions of law.
Neither the language nor the practice in the cases discussed in
this article suggests that the Appeals Chambers require
themselves to defer to statements of law made by the Trial
Chambers. In Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber refused to-
consider arguments concerning the definitions of the crime of
persecution, because the appellant "[did] not identify any legal
error on the part of the Trial Chamber, such as, for example, a
discrepancy between the elements of the crime identified by him
and those identified by the Trial Chamber." ,' The Appeals
Chamber pointed out that an Appeal Brief must be more than a
restatement of one's argument before the Trial Chamber; 76 it
must identify the Trial Chamber's legal error. The Appeals
Chamber does preserve for itself some right to raise legal issues
on its own motion: "Without guidance from the appellant, the
173. Kupreskic, $ 27.
174. Kupreskic, T 26 (quoting from Furundzija, $ 35). See Fleming, supra n. 28, for an
extended discussion of standards of review on appeal in the ICTY (based principally upon
Tadic) and ICTR (based principally on Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-19-AR72,
Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration) (ICTR App. Chamber
Mar. 31, 2000) (discussed further infra Part I1 (B)(2)), and related litigation).
175. Kupreskic, $ 26 (discussing ICTY Stat. art. 5(h)).
176. Id. at$ 26.
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Appeals Chamber will only address legal errors where the Trial
Chamber has made a glaring mistake."' 77 Counsel cannot,
however, rely on the Appeals Chamber to search the record for
glaring error; counsel must take care to raise all issues worthy of
consideration.
The ICTR Appeals Chamber set out a standard for what
makes an error of law "invalidate a decision" in its Akayesu
judgment, whose authentic version is in French:
La Chambre d'appel peut-elle examiner toutes les erreurs
de droit all6gu6es?
De prime abord, l'article 24 1) ne mentionne que les erreurs
de droit qui invalident la dcision, c'est-i-dire les erreurs
qui, si elles sont av&r6es, ont un impact sur le verdict de
culpabilit6,'
Briefly, in English, an error of law invalidates a decision if it is
an established error of law that "has an impact on the verdict of
guilt."
There are some examples, especially from the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, of the types of errors of law that will
invalidate a decision. Use of an improper definition of a crime
that disadvantaged a party-whether prosecution or accused-is
one ground for invalidating a decision.' 79 Multiple convictions
for crimes with materially similar elements arising out of the
same conduct will invalidate all but one conviction for each act
and will require resentencing.' 80 An indictment that does not
fairly inform the accused of the charges against him or her will
invalidate a conviction. However, by itself it will not bar a
retrial of which the accused has fair notice. ' 8' Use by the court of
improper evidence at sentencing (for example, considering the
177. Id. at 27; see also Akayesu, 17.
178. Akayesu,[ 18.
179. See Kupreskic, 26 (accused could claim improper definition applied); Tadic, f[
68-144 (prosecution claim that Trial Chamber applied improper definition of "control"
under international law was necessary to reversal of acquittal on count charging grave
breaches of Geneva Conventions).
180. Delalic, 1$ 412-32.
181. Kupreskic, 124-25.
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accused's silence at trial) has invalidated a sentence and
required re-sentencing.'8
On the other hand, except for matters of general importance
to the jurisprudence of the Tribunals,'83 an error that had no
effect on the judgment challenged will not be reviewed; it does
not invalidate a decision. For example, a possible error in
characterizing whether a substantive defense, tu quoque, was
raised at trial by the accused would not be considered by the
Appeals Chamber where the error had no bearing on the
accused's conviction."
b. Errors of Fact (with or without newly admitted
evidence on appeal)
An error of fact is grounds for appeal if it has "occasioned
a miscarriage of justice." "'s As discussed above, the Appeals
Chambers appear to recognize two sorts of errors of fact: simple
errors concerning what happened and errors of application of
facts to a correct standard of law.'86 The standard under which
the Appeals Chamber will review alleged errors of fact is a
complex matter.'87 The Kupreskic decision may create new
opportunities for counsel to argue issues of fact before the
Appeals Chambers.
182. Delalic, $$ 781-85.
183. See supra Part I (D)(1), nn. 155-56 and accompanying text. The Appeals Chambers
may wish to articulate an explicit standard delineating which errors will be considered
prejudicial enough to require reversal or retrial and which will be considered harmless.
Compare e.g. Delalic, [ 781-85 (error considering accused's silence requires
resentencing) with e.g. Musema, T 399 (invalidation of conviction on one count did not
require resentencing, because remaining counts required life sentence).
184. Kupreskic, $ 25. The accused there claimed that the Trial Chamber had improperly
construed their arguments as raising the defense of tu quoque (roughly, and controversially,
a claim that in an armed conflict, the other side had done the same things the accused are
charged with), but the Appeals Chamber held that this error "had no bearing on the
conviction of the Defendants [sic-" accused" is the usual term in the Tribunals]." Id.
Presumably, though the Appeals Chamber did not say so, this is because the addition of a
ground of defense could not have prejudiced the accused.
185. ICTY Stat. art. 25(l)(b); ICTR Stat. art. 24(l)(b).
186. See supra text accompanying nn. 167-70.
187. See generally Fleming, supra n. 28 (extensive discussion and critique of the
Appeals Chambers' review of facts, especially at request of prosecution).
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The ICTY Appeals Chamber has used language disfavoring
appellate review of factual issues. This language will be familiar
to many lawyers, especially from common law systems:
The task of hearing, assessing and weighing the evidence
presented at trial is left to the Judges sitting in a Trial
Chamber. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber must give a
margin of deference to a finding of fact reached by a Trial
Chamber. It is only where the evidence relied on by the
Trial Chamber could not reasonably have been accepted by
any reasonable person that the Appeals Chamber can
substitute its own finding for that of the Trial Chamber. It
is important to note that two judges, both acting reasonably,
can come to different conclusions on the basis of the same
evidence. 8
The italicized sentence above provides the basic standard for
review of allegations of factual error in the Appeals Chambers.
Subsequently, the ICTY Appeals Chamber restated this
standard and added another general situation in which it could
reverse a finding of fact: "where the evaluation of the evidence
is wholly erroneous." '89 In Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber
stated that where the evidence relied on at trial could not
reasonably have been accepted by any reasonable person or the
evaluation of evidence at trial was wholly erroneous, the
Appeals Chamber
will overturn the conviction since, under such
circumstances, no reasonable tribunal of fact could be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
participated in the criminal conduct.'9°
The Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic also pointed out that "what
constitutes a 'wholly erroneous' evaluation of the evidence
must... be determined on a case-by-case basis." '9'
Kupreskic demonstrates that the Appeals Chamber may
engage in an in-depth reevaluation of evidence in order to make
this determination. In that case, it engaged in such reevaluation
because the convictions of the accused rested primarily upon the
188. Tadic, $ 64 (emphasis added).
189. Aleksovski, 63;followed in Kupreskic, $ 30.
190. Kupreskic, $ 41 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
191. Id. at $ 225; see also Musema, $ 211.
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testimony of a single eyewitness. Without reversing the rule that
uncorroborated eyewitness testimony may support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Appeals Tribunal discussed
at length cases from both civil and common law countries
.• 192
recognizing problems raised by eyewitness testimony. It then
undertook an examination of factors that affected the credibility
of the eyewitness, such as: the difficulty of the circumstances
under which the identification was made;'93 the confidence of the
witness's demeanor; 94 matters concerning a prior statement;'
95
her familiarity with her neighbors; 196 the detail of her description
of the attack and alleged attackers;'97 comparison of her
testimony with the written statements of another witness;' 98 the
possibility of others having influenced her testimony; ' 99
inconsistencies with the remainder of the evidentiary record,2°°
including evidence admitted into the record for the first time on
• 201/ ." 202
appeal; 0 and absence of corroboration. - Based on its own
evaluation of these factors, it rejected the decision of the Trial
Chamber to accept the testimony of the witness as evidence that
could prove the participation of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.0 3
The Appeals Chamber stated that all of these factors had
weight, although the Trial Chamber had not considered some of
them in its judgment.'04 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber
reasoned that it was not really reweighing the evidence
considered by the Trial Chamber and reaching a different
conclusion. The Appeals Chamber was convinced that, had the
Trial Chamber considered all the factors it should have, "it
192. Kupreskic, 9[91 33-40.
193. Id. atf99 132-35.
194. Id. at sT 136-39.
195. Id. at 9s 140-45, 155-63.
196. Id. at 11 146-50.
197. Id. at 9191 151-54.
198. Id. at 919 155-90.
199. Id. at 9T 191-201.
200. Id. at 9 202-18.
201. Id. at 9191 203-16; followed in Musemna, 1 185.
202. Kupreskic, 91 219-21.
203. Id. at 91 222-27.
204. Id. at $$ 223-24.
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would not have accepted the identification evidence of this
single witness as the basis upon which to convict the
Defendants." 2 05 This reasoning evinces a willingness to review a
Trial Court's evaluation of evidence that goes well beyond what
might be expected from the bare language that a finding of fact
must be "wholly erroneous" or "could not reasonably have
been accepted by any reasonable person" in order to be
reversed. This type of review, however, will probably not apply
symmetrically to prosecution and defense appeals., The Appeals
Chamber was quite clear that the witness's testimony could not
be accepted beyond reasonable doubt-not that it had been
proven untrue.
Where the prosecution seeks to appeal a. judgment of
acquittal on the basis of an error of fact, it has a much more
difficult task. It must show not only that its proposed finding is
likely true, but also that no reasonable finder of fact could have
any reasonable doubt about that fact.2°6 Nonetheless, in Tadic,
the Appeals Chamber appears to have upheld a prosecution
appeal of an acquittal on this ground. However, in that case,
there was no evidence contradicting the prosecution's position
that the accused had been involved in certain murders.2 7 It is
harder to see an Appeals Chamber reweighing contradictory
evidence under the "wholly erroneous" standard and concluding
that the only reasonable conclusion a reasonable tribunal could
reach is that an accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Appeals Chambers tests the credibility of the new
evidence presented to them. In Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber
admitted new evidence, and held a hearing "with the purpose of
testing the veracity of ... three witnesses."2 8 Although the
205. Id. at$ 225.
206. See generally Fleming, supra n. 28 (extended discussion of prosecutorial appeals of
factual matters).
207. Tadic, 1 182-234. This decision is complex. The Appeals Chamber appears to do
two things. First, it is treating as an error of fact the Trial Chamber's refusal to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Tadic participated at all in certain killings. Second, it is stating that
under the correct legal definitions for crimes against humanity and accomplice liability,
Tadic was guilty of crimes against humanity. One commentator criticizes this case in part
for appearing to shift a burden to the defense to produce some evidence to contradict the
prosecution case. Fleming, supra n. 28.
208. Kupreskic, 91 505; see generally id. at 1 481-507 in Annex A: Procedural
Background.
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Chamber avoided the term "cross-examination" as being
oriented to the common law, it did permit testing the credibility
of witnesses through examination by all sides in court.
Documentary and other evidence apparently were admitted
without an oral evidentiary proceeding.2 ° Counsel needs to be
aware of these options for presentation of new evidence and to
be able to justify a request to admit it with or without an oral
evidentiary hearing, as desired.
The extent to which Kupreskic's treatment of credibility
determinations will influence appellate jurisprudence in the
Tribunals, or in international criminal law more generally,
remains to be seen. It apparently allows defense counsel wide
latitude to argue credibility, especially of eyewitnesses, on
appeal. By contrast, the prosecution will seek to limit its
applicability to the special case in which uncorroborated
eyewitness testimony is the only evidence of one or more
elements essential to the case against the accused.
Perhaps the greatest difference the appellate practitioner
from a common law system will find in the Appeals Chambers
is the opportunity to offer new evidence on appeal. 2 ' This is a
regular feature of some appellate courts in many civil law
systems, but the practice is often disfavored in the common
law.22 In the Appeals Chambers, if new evidence is admitted,
the entire record can then be reexamined to determine whether
there has been a factual error that has occasioned a miscarriage
of justice, under the standards discussed above."'
The standard for admitting new evidence on appeal was
developed by the Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic. New evidence
209. Id. at T 505; ICTY Stat. art. 21(4)(e) (right of accused "to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him"); ICTR Stat. 20(4)(e) (same); but see ICTY R. P. &
Evid. 85(B); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 85(B) (both referring to cross-examination). One
commentator has recently argued that appellate proceedings to admit new evidence in
international criminal tribunals should be oral, because of the need to test credibility. See
Christoph J.M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure 336-37 (Oxford
U. Press 2001).
210. See Kupreskic, 1481-507.
211. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 115; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 115; see supra part I(C)(l), text
accompanying n. 101.
212. See generally Kupreskic, IM 45-46.
213. Id. at 44; see other portions of the opinion discussed supra nn. 191-203 and
accompanying text; followed in Musema, 185.
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is admissible in appeal under Rule 115214 when "the new
evidence goes to prove an underlying fact that was at issue in theril,,2 T"
original trial. The evidence generally must have been
unavailable at trial, given reasonable diligence of trial counsel.
Reasonable diligence of trial counsel includes using the
mechanisms to obtain evidence available under the Statute and
Rules of the Tribunal, though an exception may be made for
gross negligence of trial counsel. 216 Most importantly, admission
of the new evidence under Rule 115 must be "in the interests of
justice." Under prior interpretations, this occurred "if [the new
evidence] is relevant to a material issue, if it is credible and if it
is such that it would probably show that a conviction or sentence
was unsafe." 217 The Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic admitted it
was difficult to make the preliminary judgment to admit
evidence on appeal in a way that did not prejudice the eventual
decision on the merits. The decision of whether to admit may be
made either before or at the time of the appeals judgment on the
merits.28 It therefore modified this standard so that now,
[the] standard for the admission of additional evidence
under Rule 115 on appeal is whether that evidence "could"
have had an impact on the verdict, rather than whether it
"would probably" have done so.' 219
Ultimately, an "unsafe" conviction is one based upon an error
of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; i.e., which
meets the ultimate statutory standard of review for factual errors,
discussed above.
20
All of these cases discuss defense appeals following
conviction and sentence. The Rules on their face allow the
prosecution to seek admission of new evidence on appeal. In
214. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 115; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 115.
215. Kupreskic, 49. Matters going to facts not contested in the Trial Chamber can be
admitted pursuant to ICTY R. P. & Evid. 89(C) and 107. Kupreskic, 91 55 (example of
qualification of trial judge raised on appeal).
216. Kupreskic, [ 50-51.
217. Id. at 54 (quoting from Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Decision on Request to
Admit Additional Evidence (ICTY App. Chamber Nov. 15, 2000)) (emphasis added by later
court).
218. Kupreskic, 71 (relying on ICTY R. P. & Evid. 115, 117).
219. Id. at$ 68.
220. See id. at 1 54, 58, 64-69.
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fact, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has done so in the context of
an interlocutory appeal, rather than in an appeal from a final
judgment.' In this context, the definition of miscarriage of
justice obviously does not depend on whether a conviction is
unsafe."
As with the development of the general standard of review
of factual errors, it remains to be seen whether this expansion of
admissibility of new evidence on appeal will greatly change the
jurisprudence or caseload of the tribunals. Counsel should,
however, be aware that important evidence coming to their
attention after trial may be admissible on appeal, and they
should examine it under the developing standards of the
Tribunal.
Finally, one must note that the Appeals Chambers have
retained the ability to admit evidence on appeal through another
route: if the matters concerned were not litigated at trial. In these
cases, "the Appeals Chamber is in the same position as a Trial
Chamber, so that Rule 107 applies to permit the Appeals
Chamber to admit any relevant or probative evidence pursuant
to Rule 89(C)."'22 This appears to create a peculiar situation, in
which there is greater latitude to admit evidence if an issue was
not properly raised than if it had been raised. However, as
discussed immediately below, issues not raised in the Trial
Chamber in an appropriate manner are in general waived.223
Counsel therefore should not wait to raise issues until appeal,
because they risk waiving the issue.
221. Id. at 58 (discussing Prosecutor v. Senanza, ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, 1[ 41, 45
(ICTR App. Chamber May 31, 2000)). In Senanza, the accused filed a motion for release,
claiming the ICTR lacked jurisdiction due to his illegal arrest and detention. His motion
was denied and he filed an interlocutory appeal with the ICTR Appeals Chamber. During
this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that
Semanza's arrest and detention were in fact legal, and his appeal was dismissed.
222. Kupreskic, 91 55 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-2 I-A, Order in Relation to
Witnesses on Appeal (ICTY App. Chamber May 19, 2000)) (emphasis in original). Among
the cases cited in Kupreskic, [ 55 n. 97, in support of this proposition is Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Decision (Concerning Motions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 Appellant's Brief
Relative to the Following Motions Referred to by the Order Dated 30 November 1999)
(ICTR App. Chamber May 24, 2000). ICTY R. P. & Evid. 107 allows the Appeals
Chamber to apply to itself, to the extent appropriate, rules that facially apply to the Trial
Chambers. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 89(C) is the general rule of admissibility of relevant
evidence. Accord ICTR R. P. & Evid. 107, 89(C).
223. See infra Part I(D)(3).
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3. Preservation of Issues (Waiver)
A party generally cannot raise an issue on appeal if the
issue was not raised at trial. As in many national judicial
systems, "[t]he appeal process of the International Tribunal is
not designed for the purpose of allowing parties to remedy their
own failings or oversights during trial or sentencing., 24 Failure
to properly raise an issue in the trial court is sometimes referred
to as "waiver" 225 of an issue on appeal or "failure to preserve"
an issue for appeal. This rule, however, is not absolute. In one
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused could
have raised an issue related to the bias of a Trial Chamber judge
in the Trial Chamber but did not. In another, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber found that the accused could have raised an issue as to
the validity of a guilty plea in the Trial Chamber but did not.
The Appeals Chambers nonetheless considered the allegations
226
on their merits and rejected them.
There is no clear rule concerning when either Appeals
Chamber will permit either party to raise issues on appeal that
were not preserved below. One possibility, suggested by the
examples of alleged bias of a Trial Chamber judge or the
invalidity of a guilty plea, would be a "fundamental error" rule.
The Appeals Chambers would consider errors so fundamental
they would impugn the integrity of the entire proceeding, even if
they had not been properly preserved. An advocate might also
suggest adoption of something like the recent "glaring mistake"
standard allowing the Appeals Chamber to raise a ground for
appeal.227 Some national courts allow "plain error" to be raised
on appeal, even if the issue was not properly preserved. 22' Trial
224. Delalic, 790, n. 1339 (quoting Erdemovic, T 15, and relying on Furundzija, $ 174,
discussed infra at n. 226 and accompanying text).
225. See e.g. Kupreskic, $ 123.
226. Kambanda v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-23-A, Judgement, [ 52-55 (ICTR App.
Chamber Oct. 19, 2000); Furundzija, [ 174-215.
227. Kupreskic, 27, discussed supra n. 177 and accompanying text. In the Kupreskic
decision, the Appeals Chamber made the point that the appellant should state its grounds
for appeal, and that "without guidance from the appellant, the Appeals Chamber will only
address legal errors where the Trial Chamber has made a glaring mistake."
228. For example, the United States allows "plain error" to be raised on appeal through
Fed. R. Evid. 103. Rule 103 adopted its "plain error rule" language from Rule 52(b) of the
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counsel must, however, realize that the case in which the
Appeals Chamber allows a new ground to be raised on appeal
will be rare. Counsel must, therefore, take care that all
substantial grounds for appeal are properly preserved.
One final point: Grounds for appeal can be abandoned as
well as waived.229 While the Appeals Chamber does not state
what constitutes abandonment on appeal, counsel would be well
advised to provide briefing on any ground deemed important,
rather than simply to state the ground in the appeals document.
As noted above, counsel should not only identify a ground for
appeal, but also provide some argument in its support."3
4. Use of Precedent in the ICTY and ICTR
In international law, precedent plays a much different role
than it does in common law domestic courts. Traditionally,
judicial decisions are "subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of [international] law."23 ' The precedents that are often
most influential in traditional international law are the acts of
nation-states that make up "international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law" 232-usually acts of the
political arms of government. The Appeals Chambers of the
ICTY and ICTR are helping to remake the role of precedent in
international law.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber considered the precedential
effect of its own decisions at length in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
eventually reaching the following conclusions:
107. The Appeals Chamber... concludes that a proper
construction of the [ICTY] Statute, taking due account of
its text and purpose, yields the conclusion that in the
interests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals
Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but should
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also e.g. Jones v. U.S., 527 U.S. 373 (1999)
(allowing a review for "plain error" of jury instructions in a death penalty case).
229. Kupreskic, 91 395.
230. Id. at T1 27, discussed supra nn. 173-74 and accompanying text.
231. ICJ Stat. art. 38(I)(d).
232. Id. at art. 38(l)(b). International custom is a complex area of the law with an
immense literature.
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be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the
interests of justice.
108. Instances of situations where cogent reasons in the
interests of justice require a departure from a previous
decision include cases where the previous decision has
been decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or
cases where a previous decision has been given per
incuriam, that is a judicial decision that has been "wrongly
decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill-
informed about the applicable law."
109. It is necessary to stress that the normal rule is that
previous decisions are to be followed, and departure from
them is the exception. The Appeals Chamber will only
depart from a previous decision after the most careful
consideration has been given to it, both as to the law,
including the authorities cited, and the facts."'
In the discussion preceding this statement, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber attempts to minimize the current difference in practice
between civil law, common law, and international courts in their
use of precedent.14 Thus, it does not explicitly state that it is
following the common-law model of stare decisis. The advocate
before either Tribunal would, however, be well advised to
understand relevant prior cases in either Tribunal and to
consider how such cases might be applied to the matter at hand.
In the Appeals Chambers, prior decisions of both Chambers
are treated in a manner that resembles treatment of a single
court's own prior cases within the common law system. For
example, the ICTR Appeals Chamber recently determined the
standards for acceptance of a guilty plea in Kambanda v.
Prosecutor.235 In doing so, it accepted the reasoning of a guilty
plea case from the ICTY Appeals Chamber.236 In the same case,
233. IT-95-14/I-T, Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber Mar. 24, 2000) (footnote omitted).
Accord Delalic, [ 8.
234. Aleksovski, 1 92-107. Whether this attempt is successful as an intellectual matter
will be left for another time.
235. Kambanda, 1 49-95 (discussed infra in Part II (B)(3)).
236. Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 7,
1997)).
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the ICTR Appeals Chamber also accepted the reasoning of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in determining what counts as waiver
of an issue by failure to present it to the Trial Chamber.237
Technically, the ICTY and ICTR are separate Tribunals, and in
fact, because of personnel changes, most of the judges in the
Kambanda case were different from the judges in the prior
ICTY cases. Thus, it appears that counsel may use precedent
from the Appeals Chamber in either Tribunal in a manner that
closely resembles the use of precedent in a single common law
appellate court.238 The ICTR Appeals Chamber did not, however,
specifically state that it was bound by the law or reasoning of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber, and thus care should be exercised by
counsel when using prior case law.
Other sources and evidence of international law239 may not
be ignored. Just a few examples of the diversity of sources and
evidence used by the Appeals Chamber will be mentioned here.
They have taken into account generally recognized international
human rights of defendants, as well as rights of victims, as a
source of the law that they apply. For example, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber has applied the right to appeal found in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in holding
that a person convicted of contempt by the ICTY has the right to
appeal that conviction.24 ° It also used a regional multilateral
treaty (the European Convention on Human Rights) and cases in
the European Court of Human Rights (established to apply that
treaty) in determining that judges must be impartial.2 4' The ICTR
Appeals Chamber has also relied on an administrative agency
237. Id. at T 15-34 (relying on Furundzija, $ 174; Tadic, T 55 (ICTY App. Chamber
July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, No. IT-97-24-AR73 $ 33 (ICTY App. Chamber
July 2, 1998)).
238. Where different substantive law applies in the two Tribunals (as in the definition of
some crimes, discussed supra Part I(A)), or there are different procedural Rules in the
Tribunals, precedent from the other Tribunal may not be that useful.
239. E.g. ICJ Stat. art. 38.
240. See generally Tadic (Appeal of Vujin) (contempt may be appealed, even when
initially found by Appeals Chamber) (relying on International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 14 (Dec. 16, 1966) (available at <http://www.sas.upenn.edu>)
[hereinafter ICCPR], as discussed in Secretary-General's Rep., supra n. 1).
241. Furundzija, $ 181 & n. 243 (relying on European Convention on Human Rights,
art. 6 (I); Piersack v. Belgium, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at $ 30 (1982); and many other
cases from the European Court of Human Rights).
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charged with interpreting human rights documents, writings of
scholars, and cases of national courts.14' The ICTY Appeals
Chamber has looked at national statutes and cases to determine
if the defense of "diminished mental capacity" was one of the
"general principles of law recognized by all nations." 2 43 It has
also looked to international customary law to define the crime of
"violating the laws and customs of war." 2 44 Custom and general
principles of law are both important sources of international law.
E. Post-Appellate Review as Provided by the Statutes
and Rules: A Brief Note
The Tribunals allow for review proceedings after (or in
some cases before) the completion of appeals."' The ICTR
Appeals Chamber has applied its Statute and Rules to hold that a
party (either the prosecutor or the accused) may seek review of a
final judgment of the Appeals Chamber if "new facts are
discovered which were not known at the time of the trial or
appeal proceedings and which could have been a decisive factor
in the decision." 2 46 Additionally, the new facts must meet the
condition introduced by [ICTR] Rule 120, that the new
facts not be known to the party concerned or not be
discoverable due diligence notwithstanding. If the Chamber
is satisfied, it accordingly reviews its decision in the light
of such new facts.247
New facts, not merely new evidence (or presumably,
arguments), must have been discovered in order for the Appeals
Chamber to review a decision.248
242. Kambanda, U 33-34 & nn. 48-49.
243. Delalic, 1 583, 584-90. Cf. ICJ Stat. art. 38(l)(c).
244. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94- 1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction 87 (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995); cf ICJ Stat. art. 38(1)(b).
245. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor's Request
for Review or Reconsideration) (ICTR Appeals Chamber Mar. 31, 2000) (relying on ICTR
Statute, art. 25; ICTR Rule 120). See also ICTY Statute, art. 26; ICTY Rule 119.
246. Barayagwiza, 51. In this case, review was granted to consider a new fact that
showed the Chamber's decision to dismiss an indictment on the ground of unreasonable
pre-trial delay was incorrect. The prosecutor prevailed on the motion for review.
247. Id. at$ 52.
248. Id. at T 54. This case is discussed in more detail infra Part II(B)(2).
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A motion for review goes to the Chamber (whether Trial
Chamber or Appeals Chamber) that made the decision to be
reviewed.2 49 Under the Rules, the prosecutor has only a year in
which to discover new facts, a limitation which is not placed on
the defense (and which does not appear in the Statutes).25° If new
facts are discovered after the Trial Chamber's judgment but
before completion of the appeal, a motion for review may still
be filed with the appropriate Chamber, and the Appeals
Chamber may return the case to the Trial Chamber for
disposition.25 '
The Tribunals must take care that the review process not
impinge on the principle that "[n]o one shall be liable to be...
tried... again for an offense for which he has already been
finally.., acquitted." '252 This provision of international human
rights law is from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (" ICCPR"), an international human rights treaty
that on its face applies only to States. In the jurisprudence of the
Tribunals, provisions of the ICCPR are applied in courts created
by international organizations as well.25 The ICTY and ICTR
Statutes protect persons from trial "before a national court for
acts... for which he or she has already been tried by the
International Tribunal." 25 4 In light of the relevant international
human rights norms, one could interpret the prohibition of a
249. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 119; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 120.
250. Compare ICTY R. P. & Evid. 119 and ICTR R. P. & Evid. 120 (limiting
prosecution time to request review) with ICTY Stat. art. 26 & ICTR Stat. art. 25 (no such
limit).
251. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 122; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 123.
252. ICCPR art. 14; see ICTY R. P. & Evid. 122; ICTR R. P. & Evid. 123. See also
supra n. 87 and accompanying text.
253. See infra Part Ii(A)(4), notes 300-01 and accompanying text, discussing Prosecutor
v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), for an example of adoption of an international human rights
standard in the ICCPR that is not in the text of the ICTY Statute. Note that Barayagwiza, as
decided, does not offend the rule against being tried twice, because Barayagwiza had not
been tried on the merits when the case against him was dismissed. (See supra nn. 246-48
and accompanying text for discussion of Barayagwiza).
254. ICTY Stat. art. 10; ICTR Stat. art. 9. These provisions also prevent trials by the
International Tribunal for crimes tried by national tribunals, unless: (1) the national courts
characterized the allegations as ordinary crimes (rather than serious violations of
international humanitarian law); (2) the case was not diligently prosecuted; (3) the case was
not independent and impartial; or (4) the case was designed to shield the accused from
international criminal responsibility.
APPEALS IN THE AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 637
second trial in a national court as being based on the assumption
that there would certainly not be a second international trial once
proceedings were finalized.
II. RECENT JUDGMENTS OF THE ICTY
AND ICTR APPEALS CHAMBERS
The best way to appreciate the work of the ICTY and ICTR
Appeals Chamber is to review their case law. In this Part, some
recent judgments are discussed. Counsel should be aware that a
number of important appeals are pending before the ICTY and
ICTR Appeals Chambers."' The October 2001 Kupreskic
appeals decision is not discussed in this Part, given its extensive
incorporation in Part I (D) on Scope and Standards of Review.256
As discussed earlier, the emergence of precedent within the
Appeals Chambers, between the two Trial Chambers, and even
255. For the ICTY: the Blaskic decision; the Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic decisions; the
Kordic and Cerkez decisions, and the Krstic decision. See ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY
Proceedings-August 2001 <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm> (accessed on
Sept. 7, 2001). For the ICTR: In late May 2001, it heard the Musema appeal, which has
been decided since this article was originally written. See supra n. 161. The Rutaganda
appeal also is pending. Musema, director of a tea factory ini western Rwanda, was
convicted on January 27, 2000, of one count of genocide and two counts of crimes against
humanity (extermination and rape). The three counts for which he was convicted related to
his participation in anti-Tutsi attacks in April and May, 1994. In one such attack, Musema
was found to have ordered that a cave in which 300 to 400 Tutsis had sought refuge be
sealed and then set on fire. All but one Tutsi perished. He was also held liable for the acts
carried out by his employees, over whom he was found to have de jure control, an
important extension of the doctrine of superior responsibility outside the military context
and into the context of a civilian workplace. See Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T,
Judgement 141-148 (ICTR Tr. Chamber Jan. 27, 2000). The Trial Chamber sentenced
Rutaganda to life imprisonment on December 6, 1999, following conviction on one count
of genocide and two counts of crimes against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement (ICTR Tr. Chamber Dec. 6, 1999). When the genocide broke out,
Rutaganda was a leading member of the governing Hutu Power political party as well as
second Vice-President of the national committee of the Interahamwe militia. The
Interahamwe are notorious for having been a major agent in the anti-Tutsi pogroms. The
Trial Chamber held that Rutaganda incurred individual criminal responsibility for having
ordered, incited, and carried out murders and for causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the Tutsi ethnic group. Id. at 469-70. The Prosecutor is appealing the
acquittal at trial of Ignace Bagilishema. See ICTR Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-284.EN,
Bagilishema to Reside in France pending Appeal (Sept. 21, 2001).
256. In fact, many of the judgments discussed in this Part have been referenced in Part I.
Nonetheless, reviewing the facts and key substantive legal pronouncements of these
judgments provides a good flavor of the work of the ad hoc Tribunals.
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outside of the Tribunals themselves is an important new
phenomenon. This development gives a principled provenance
to Tribunal judgments. To reiterate: The Appeals Chambers'
judgments (as well as those of the Trial Chambers) are based on
a rich variety of sources in addition to Tribunal precedent,
including interpretation of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR,
international conventions, principles of international law,
general principles as evidenced by important national and
regional court decisions, the writings of important legal experts,
and even decisions of other international courts such as the
International Court of Justice.257 Because there has been a great
deal written about the earlier case law of the Tribunals,25 8 this
Part focuses on decisions of the Appeals Chambers since the
beginning of the year 2000.
A. ICTY Appeals Chamber
1. Prosecutor v. Jelisic
Goran Jelisic, who called himself the "Serb Adolf," held a
position of authority at the Luka Camp, located in Brcko in
northeastern Bosnia. From early May 1992 until early July 1992,
Bosnian Serb forces confined hundreds of Muslims and Croats
under inhumane conditions at this Camp. Jelisic was indicted on
thirty-one charges of crimes against humanity and violations of
the laws and customs of war, along with one count of
genocide. 59 Allegations were made that Jelisic murdered,
257. In this latter regard, neither the Appeals nor the Trial Chamber is bound to follow
these prior decisions. In fact, in the 1999 Tadic decision, the ICTY declined to follow the
ICJ's 1986 holding in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
$$ 277, 278, 292(3) and (9) (June 27), that the United States was responsible for the acts of
the Contra rebels in Nicaragua only to the extent that the United States could be shown to
have effective control over the activities of the Contras. See Celebici Case, $191 10-26
(affirming the Tadic approach).
258. E.g. Jones, supra n. 11l; M. Cherif Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Pubs. 1996);
Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(Transnational Pubs. 1998).
259. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgement $ 2 (ICTY App. Chamber
July 5, 2001).
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tortured, and beat detainees at Luka. He pleaded guilty to the
thirty-one charges, resisting only the genocide charge. On
October 19, 1999, the ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted Jelisic on
the genocide charge and sentenced him to forty years'
imprisonment on the charges to which he had pled guilty.260 The
lengthy sentence was based on the Trial Chamber's observation
of Jelisic's "scornful attitude towards victims, his enthusiasm
for committing the crimes, his dangerous nature, and also the
inhumanity of the crimes." 26' The Jelisic trial was the first
genocide proceeding undertaken by the ICTY.
The prosecutor appealed the genocide acquittal, and Jelisic
appealed the sentence. On July 5, 2001, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber affirmed the sentence of forty years.262 The ICTY
Rules provide that a convicted person may be sentenced to
imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of
that person's life.263 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has the
discretion to impose life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber
held that the ICTY Trial Chamber "has broad discretion as to
which factors it may consider in sentencing and the weight to
attribute to them 264The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber did not exercise this discretion in an erroneous
fashion.
2 65
As for the Prosecutor's appeal, although the Appeals
Chamber found some error in the Trial Chamber's treatment of
the law, it declined to reverse the genocide acquittal. The
Appeals Chamber held that the correct test for determining
whether prosecution evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction "is whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon
which a reasonable [trier] of fact could be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular
charge in question."266 As for the law on genocide, the Appeals
260. ld. at 5.
261. ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./454-e, Goran Jelisic Sentenced to 40 Years
Inprisonment (sic)for Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes <http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/p454-e.htm> (Dec. 14, 1999).
262. Jelisic, Appeals Judgement, Disposition (7).
263. ICTY Stat. art. 24; ICTY R. P. & Evid. 101(A).
264. Jelisic, $ 100.
265. Id. at 11110-11.
266. Id. at 137.
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Chamber clarified that the requisite intent is one to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group by
one of the acts prohibited in the Statute of the ICTY.267 The
existence of a plan or policy is not a necessary legal ingredient
of the crime of genocide, although it may certainly constitute
probative evidence.268 Notwithstanding the need to point out
errors and to make clarifications, the Appeals Chamber did not
consider it appropriate to reverse the acquittal and remit the case
for further proceedings.269
2. Prosecutor v. Furundzija
Anto Furundzija commanded a special unit of the military
police force of the Croatian Defense Council known as the
"Jokers." He was charged with violations of the laws or
customs of war (specifically, torture and outrages upon personal
dignity, including rape) for his conduct at the "Jokers"'
headquarters, where he interrogated a female Muslim civilian
and a Croatian soldier and was present while the civilian was
raped and both the civilian and the soldier were beaten.
Furundzija did nothing to stop or curtail these actions. The Trial
Chamber sentenced Furundzija to ten years' imprisonment
following conviction on December 10, 1998, on two counts of
violating the laws or customs of war. 7° He appealed. On July 21,
2000, the Appeals Chamber unanimously dismissed each ground
of Furundzija's appeal, upheld the Trial Chamber's ruling, and
also upheld the sentence awarded by the Trial Chamber.27 ' By
affirming the Trial Chamber decision, the Appeals Chamber
gave its imprimatur to some of the important points of law
contained within that decision.
One important substantive point of law is that the
prohibition of torture had attained the status of a norm of
267. Id. at T 45.
268. Id. at 91 48.
269. Id. at $$ 72-77.
270. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/I -T, Judgement (ICTY Tr. Chamber Dec. 10,
1998).
271. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17, Appeals Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber July
21, 2000).
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international law from which no derogation is possible.272 RapeS 273
may amount to torture. Torture in an armed conflict is defined
as:
(i) the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental; in addition
(ii) this act or omission must be intentional;
(iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or
at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the
victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any
ground, against the victim or a third person;
(iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict;
(v) at least one of the persons involved in the torture
process must be a public official or must at any rate act in a
non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a State or
274
any other authority-wielding entity.
Procedurally, the Trial Chamber decision was affirmed in
its conclusion that a person's testimony may be reliable
notwithstanding proof that the person is suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder.275
3. Prosecutor v. Delic, Landzo, Mucic, and Delalic (the
"Celebici" Case)
On February 20, 2001, the Appeals Chamber issued its
judgment in the Celebici case. 276 This case involved events that
took place in 1992 in a prison camp near the town of Celebici, in
central Bosnia. This part of central Bosnia-predominantly
272. Id. at I[ 11.
273. The Trial Chamber held that the elements of the offense of rape include "the sexual
penetration, however slight, [either] of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or of the mouth of the victim by the
penis of the perpetrator; [where such penetration is effected] by coercion or force or threat
of force against the victim or a third person." Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 185 (ICTY Tr.
Chamber Dec. 10, 1998).
274. Furundzija, Appeals Judgement, I Ill (quoting from the Trial Chamber decision in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija 162 (Dec. 10, 1998)).
275. Furundzija, Appeals Judgement, $91 122-23.
276. Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-2 1, Appeals Judgement (ICTY App. Chamber Feb. 20,
2001).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
inhabited by Bosnian Serbs-had been taken over by Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces. Many of the Bosnian Serb
civilian inhabitants were held at the Celebici prison camp. Four
individuals-Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, Zdravko Mucic, and
Zejnil Delalic-were tried. The Celebici defendants all were
accused of actual or imputed involvement with the killings,
torture, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and cruel and
inhuman treatment that occurred at the prison camp. Although
Delalic was acquitted by the Trial Chamber, on October 15,
1998, the remaining three defendants were convicted of grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention (Article 2 of the Statute of
the ICTY) and of violating the laws or customs of war (Article 3
of the Statute of the ICTY). On November 16, 1998, they were
sentenced to the following terms of imprisonment: twenty years
(Delic); fifteen years (Landzo); and seven years (Mucic)."'
The Appeals Chamber affirmed Delalic's acquittal. It also
dismissed-for cumulative convictions-all counts charging
Mucic, Delic, and Landzo with violations of the laws or customs
of war. In light of this dismissal, the Appeals Chamber sent the
case back to the Trial Chamber for possible adjustment to the
original sentences. However, the Appeals Chamber also
reaffirmed many of the substantive points of law made by the
Trial Chamber.278
The ICTY has jurisdiction over offenses under Article 2 of
its Statute only if the Prosecutor can prove the existence of an
international armed conflict in relation to those offenses
charged. The Trial Chamber found that the armed conflict in
Bosnia was in fact international, as Bosnian Serb forces were
fighting in Bosnia under the control of the FRY. The Appeals
Chamber noted that in Tadic and Aleksovski, it had held that
what must be established is that the foreign intervening party
was in "overall" control of the local forces.279 The Appeals
Chamber also explained that it would follow its previous
decisions unless there were "cogent reasons in the interests of
justice to depart from [them]."280 With regard to the conflict in
277. Id. at 9j9 1-3.
278. Id. at % 1-5, Disposition.
279. Id. atl 6, 14, & 26.
280. Id. at 1 17.
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Bosnia, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber's
determination that the conflict was international should be
affirmed. 2 ' Bosnian Serbs detained in the Celebici camp were in
the hands of parties to the conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina, of
which they were not nationals, and they were thereby entitled to
the protection of (in particular) Geneva Convention IV, relating
to the safeguarding of civilians in times of war.282 On a closely
connected note, the Appeals Chamber also affirmed the Trial
Chamber's finding that it had jurisdiction to prosecute violations
under Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY. These violations can
give rise to individual criminal responsibility and may be
prosecuted whether committed in internal or international
conflicts.283
The Appeals Chamber also affirmed the Trial Chamber's
rulings regarding command responsibility. The Trial Chamber
had held that command responsibility encompasses not only
military commanders, but also civilians holding positions of
authority. It also had held that responsibility extended not only
to those in de jure command (in other words, those who have the
official titles and rankings), but also those in de facto command
(in other words, those who may not have the official titles, but
who exert authority in the field).2 84 Such individuals may be held
criminally responsible if they have effective control over the
persons committing the violations of international humanitarian
law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent or
punish the commission of such violations.285 Whereas Delalic
(coordinator of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces)
was found not to have had command and control over the
prison-camp and the guards who worked there, Mucic
(commander of the camp) was found to have allowed those
under his authority to commit the most heinous of offenses
without taking any disciplinary action, thereby creating an
atmosphere of terror.2 86 Delic was found not to be a superior with
28 I. Id. at$ 50.
282. Id. atT 106.
283. For discussion of this reasoning, see id. at 1 116-181.
284. Id. at T 192-93.
285. Id. at $ 197.
286. Id. at [ 204-14 (Mucic), 256-67 (Delalic).
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command and control despite his position as deputy commander
of the camp."'
The linchpin of the appeal was the question of cumulative
convictions. Here, the appellants argued that each conviction
related to the same conduct. This challenge raised a thorny
question: Can conduct simultaneously violate both Article 2 of
the ICTY Statute-grave breaches of the Geneva Convention-
as well as Article 3, violation of the laws or customs of war?
The Appeals Chamber held
that reasons of fairness to the accused and the consideration
that only distinct crimes may justify [cumulative]
convictions .... [require that cumulative] convictions...
are permissible only if each statutory provision involved
has a materially distinct element not contained in the
other.288
If this material distinctiveness is not established, then a
judicial decision must be made regarding the offense for which a
conviction will be entered. The conviction must be for the
offense containing the more specific provision. In a situation
such as that faced by some of the Celebici defendants, namely
where the evidence establishes guilt based upon the same
conduct under both Article 2 and Article 3, the conviction must
be entered for the offense under Article 2. Accordingly, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed the convictions of all counts on
violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3).289 It further
held that, because the sentences of each of the three convicted
accused may have been different had the Trial Chamber not
imposed multiple convictions, a Trial Chamber should
reconsider the remaining sentences for possible adjustment.2 9
Nevertheless, in the case of Mucic, the Appeals Chamber
advised the Trial Chamber that had it not been necessary to take
into account a possible adjustment in sentence due to the
cumulative convictions issue, it would have imposed a heavier
sentence, perhaps as much as ten years' imprisonment.9' On
287. Id. at 11299, 312.
288. Id. at 412.
289. Id. at T 427.
290. Id. at T 43 1.
291. Id. at 853.
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October 9, 2001, the Trial Chamber passed adjusted sentences of
eighteen years for Delic, fifteen years for Landzo, and nine years
for Mucic.292
4. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Vujin) and Prosecutor v. Aleksovski
(Nob ilo)- Contempt Appeals
On February 27, 2001, the Appeals Chamber upheld a
judgment it had initially made on January 31, 2000, in contempt
proceedings brought against Milan Vujin, former counsel for
Dusko Tadic, the first defendant to face trial at the ICTY.9 This
judgment involved matters related to the professional
responsibility of lawyers appearing before the ICTY. The power
to deal with contempt lies within the inherent jurisdiction of the
ICTY, deriving from its judicial function. On January 31, 2000,
the ICTY (ruling in the first instance) had found Vujin in
contempt of court for his conduct in- representing Tadic.294 The
contempt hearings were conducted from March 30, 1999 to
November 18, 1999 (when Tadic was appealing the judgment
and. sentence issued against him by the Trial Chamber in
1997).295 Regarding the questions of professional responsibility,
the Appeals Chamber found that Vujin had put forward evidence
that was known by him to be false. The Appeals Chamber also
found that Vujin had "manipulated" two unnamed witnesses
"by seeking to avoid [their] ... identification of persons who
may have been responsible for [certain] crimes for which Tadic
had been convicted." 
29 6
On February 27, 2001, the Appeals Chamber dismissed
Vujin's appeal from the initial decision and ordered him to pay a
fine of 15,000 Dutch guilders to the Registry within twenty-one
292. ICTY, Press Release P.I.S./628-e, Sentencing Judgement in the "Celebici Case"
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p628-e.htm>.
293. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94- I-A, Appeal Judgement (ICTY App.
Chamber Feb. 27, 2001).
294. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94-I-A, Judgment on Allegations of
Contempt (ICTY App. Chamber Jan. 31, 2000).
295. ICTY, Case Information Sheet, Tadic Case (IT-94-I-A) (Sept. 24, 2001).
296. Tadic (Vujin), Judgment on Allegations of Contempt, T 160.
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days. 97 The Appeals Chamber also requested the Registrar to
consider striking Vujin off or suspending him for a suitable
period from the list of assigned counsel, and also to "report"
Vujin's conduct "to the professional legal body to which he
belongs." 29 8 The Appeals Chamber did note that persons it found
guilty of contempt while sitting in the first instance must be
entitled to appeal that conviction. In the case at hand, however,
there was no reason to overturn the initial decision. The Appeals
Chamber's pronouncement upon a matter of the professional
responsibility of lawyers is giving rise to the emergence of a
nascent corpus of legal ethics principles in international criminal
law.
This decision is also significant because the Appeals
Chamber recognized that the right to appeal a criminal
conviction is a human right protected by international law that
must be respected by the Tribunals. The Court cited the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(" ICCPR")'00 as a source of this right. The ICCPR, however, is
a document that in form binds only the States that are party to it.
The United Nations, and hence the ICTY, is not a State, and
arguably this provision of the ICCPR could bind the Tribunals
only if it has passed into customary international law.3°0 Now
297. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94- I -AR-77, Appeal Judgement (ICTY
App. Chamber Feb. 27, 2001).
298. Id.
299. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not expressly provide for the right
to appeal a contempt conviction of the Appeals Chamber. See ICTY R. P. & Evid. 77.
However, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Rules
must respect the "internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused" Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[... ], Article 14(5) of [which] guarantees that "Everyone convicted of a crime
shall have the right to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law."
Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94-I-AR77 (ICTY App. Chamber Feb. 27, 2001). The Appeals
Chamber concluded that the contempt procedure is of a penal nature. "[T]his means that a
person found guilty of contempt by the Appeals Chamber [sitting in the first instance] must
have the right to appeal the conviction." Id.
300. Id. (contempt may be appealed, even when initially found by Appeals Chamber),
relying on ICCPR art. 14, as discussed in Secretary-General's Rep., supra n. 1. The
Appeals Chamber was not unanimous on the point of having jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from its own decision. See Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94- I-A, Appeals Judgement (Wald,
J., dissenting from finding of jurisdiction).
301. See Tadic (Appeal of Vujin), IT-94-1 -A, Appeals Judgement (Wald, J., dissenting).
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there is a debate within the ICTY Appeals Chamber as to
whether human rights standards that have not passed into
customary international law are binding. In the opinion of the
majority in this contempt case, the ICTY should follow human
rights provisions that are in favor of the accused, even though
these provisions might not yet be considered customary.
The second contempt appeal comes out of the Blaskic trial.
Ante Nobilo was defense counsel for Tihomir Blaskic, a
defendant before the ICTY.' °2 On December 11, 1998, the Trial
Chamber found that, in reexamination of a defense witness in
the Blaskic trial, Nobilo had disclosed information relating to
the identity of another witness; such information was subject to
a protective order in Aleksovski's trial.' °3 The Trial Chamber
held this amounted to a "knowing violation" of an order that it
had made prohibiting the disclosure of such information
regarding the witness. It found Nobilo in contempt and ordered
the payment of 4,000 Dutch guilders into the court.'°
On May 30, 2001, the Appeals Chamber allowed Nobilo's
appeal and directed the Registrar to repay the fine. °5 For the
Appeals Chamber, a basic question was whether Nobilo's
violation of the witness protection order was a "knowing"
one.' °6 According to the Appeals Chamber, actual knowledge of
the order was not required before it could be knowingly
violated. Willful blindness could suffice.3 7  The Appeals
Chamber found no evidence of willful blindness.0 8 "There can
be no wilful blindness to the existence of an order unless there is
302. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/I-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo
Against Finding of Contempt, T 2 (ICTY App. Chamber May 30, 2001).
303. Le Procureur ci Aleksovski, IT-95-14/I-T (ICTY Tr. Chamber Dec. 11, 1998)
(judgment available only in French).
304. Id. at IV. Decision.
305. Aleksovski, Nobilo Contempt Appeal, 57.
306. Id. at 137.
307. Id. at IT 39-52. The Appeals Chamber defined willful blindness as
[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of the relevant fact is accepted in such
cases where it is established that the defendant suspected that the fact existed (or
was aware that its existence was highly probable) but refrained from finding out
whether it did exist because he wanted to be able to deny knowledge of it (or he
just did not want to find out that it did exist).
Id. at T 43.
308. Id. at T 51.
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first of all shown to be a suspicion or a realization that the order
exists."309 On a related note, the Appeals Chamber held that it is
not necessary for the prosecution to establish an intention to
violate the order and that it is sufficient that the person charged
"acted with reckless indifference as to whether his act was in
violation of the order." 0
5. Prosecutor v. Tadic and Prosecutor v. Aleksovski-Sentence
Appeals
Sentence appeals are different than judgment appeals.
Whereas a judgment appeal challenges the correctness of the
finding of guilt or innocence on the respective charges, a
sentence appeal challenges the choice or amount of punishment,
not the question of guilt or innocence. Judgment and sentence
appeals may be combined.
The sentence appeal of Dusko Tadic was partly successful.
Tadic (the same accused whose case gave rise to the Vujin
professional responsibility judgment) initially was convicted by
the Trial Chamber on May 7, 1997, of eleven counts of violating
the laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity.
Tadic's appeal of the Trial Chamber judgment resulted in an
additional nine convictions: seven counts of grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions; one count of a violation of the
laws or customs of war; and one count of a crime against
humanity.3 ' On November 11, 1999, the Trial Chamber
sentenced Tadic to twenty-five years' imprisonment in light of
these additional counts (Tadic had originally been sentenced to
twenty years' imprisonment). On January 26, 2000, the Appeals
Chamber reduced Tadic's sentence on all counts to a maximum
of twenty years' imprisonment.3 In mitigating the sentence, the
Appeals Chamber was motivated by the fact that
309. Id.
310. Id. at 54.
311. Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94- I-A, Judgement 1[ 171, 235-37, 327(4) and (5) (ICTY
App. Chamber July 15, 1999).
312. ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-
e.htm> (updated Oct. 2, 2001).
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although [Tadic's] conduct ... was incontestably heinous,
his level in the command structure, when compared to that
of his superiors, i.e. commanders, or the very architects of
the strategy of ethnic cleansing, was low."'
The Appeals Chamber also overturned the Trial Chamber's
finding that a crime against humanity was a more serious
offense than a war crime and, all other things being equal,
thereby required a stricter sentence. On this point, the Appeals
Chamber held that "there is in law no distinction between the
seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war
crime." 
31 4
The second sentence appeal involved Zlatko Aleksovski.
On May 7, 1999, Aleksovski had been found guilty by the Trial
Chamber of one count of violating the laws or customs of war as
a result of his activities as commander of the Kaonik prison
facility, in which hundreds of Bosnian Muslim civilians were
detained. This conviction netted Aleksovski a sentence of two
years and six months, less time served in custody. As the time
served exceeded the sentence, Aleksovski was immediately
released. Notwithstanding the release, the prosecution appealed
both the judgment as well as the sentence. On March 24, 2000,
the Appeals Chamber allowed the prosecution's appeal and
issued a revised sentence of seven years' imprisonment."5 It was
held that the Trial Chamber had committed discernable error by
undervaluing the gravity of Aleksovski's conduct.36
The Aleksovski decision also dealt with the role of
precedent within the ICTY. Discussion of this part of the
judgment is found in Part I of this Article.
313. Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, 56 (ICTY
App. Chamber Jan. 26, 2000).
314. Id. at 69; see also separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen.
315. ICTY, Press Release CC/P.I.S./481-e, Aleksovski Case: The Appeals Chamber
Increases His Sentence to Seven Years Imprisonment <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreall
p481-e.htm> (Mar. 24, 2000); ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings
<http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm> (updated Oct. 2, 2001); ICTY, Press
Release CC/P.I.S./469-E, Aleksovski Case: The Appeals Chamber Orders Aleksovski's
Return to Custody <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p469-e.htm> (Feb. 9, 2000).
316. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement $ 187 (ICTY App. Chamber
Mar. 24, 2000).
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B. ICTR Appeals Chamber""
1. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza
In a particularly controversial decision made on November
3, 1999, the Appeals Chamber quashed the indictment against
genocide suspect Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. As a result of this
decision, Barayagwiza, a minister in the fanatical Hutu
government who helped set up a radio station used to incite anti-
Tutsi violence, was ordered released. Lengthy delays in bringing
Barayagwiza to justice were cited as the basis for this decision.
These delays were found to have violated Barayagwiza's human
rights. One and a half years had elapsed from the time of his
arrest to the time of his actually being charged, and additional
delays had occurred at the pre-trial stage.3 1
The quashing of Barayagwiza's indictment created what
Prosecutor Del Ponte called a "crisis in relations between the
ICTR and the Government of Rwanda." 3 9  The Rwandan
representative advised the United Nations General Assembly
that Rwanda would "register a vote of no confidence" in the
ICTR."0 The Rwandan government suspended all cooperation
and assistance to the ICTR 2' It also refused to issue Prosecutor
Del Ponte an entry visa. In response, Prosecutor Del Ponte filed
317. In addition to the cases detailed in this section, see Serushago v. Prosecutor, ICTR-
98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment (ICTR App. Chamber Apr. 6, 2000); ICTR, Press Release
ICTR/INFO-9-2-221 En, Appeals Chamber Confirms Serushago Sentence
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/221.htm> (Feb. 14, 2000). Serushago
was originally sentenced by the ICTR Trial Chamber on February 5, 1999 to fifteen years'
imprisonment following a guilty plea to one count of genocide and three counts of crimes
against humanity. He filed an appeal against his sentence; this appeal was dismissed on
February 14, 2000.
318. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, ICTR 97-19-A, Decision, 1$ 100-112 (ICTR App.
Chamber Nov. 3, 1999).
319. ICTY, Press Release PR/P.I.S./457-e, Statement by Madame Carla Del Ponte,
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p457-e.htm> (Dec. 22, 1999).
320. U.N., Press Release GA/9652, Assembly Appraises Progress Made By War Crimes
Tribunals; Judges Describe Obstacles <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/l1999/
19991108.ga9652.doc.html> (Nov. 8, 1999).
321. ICTR, Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-210.En, Barayagwiza Seeks Partial Stay of
Appeal Order <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLlSH/PRESSREL/1999/210.htm> (Nov. 8, 1999).
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with the Appeals Chamber a notice to suspend the release,
which was followed up on December 1, 1999, with a brief in
support of a motion that the Appeals Chamber review its
decision of November 3, 1999, to free Barayagwiza. The
government of Rwanda relented in early December 1999,
issuing Del Ponte her visa and resuming cordial relations with
the ICTR. 22 This development is very important, as the effective
operation of the ICTR largely depends on the cooperation of the
Rwandan government.
Although authorized by ICTR Statute as well as its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, a request for review remains an
unusual procedure. There were difficult questions regarding
whether delays owing to (1) the length of transfer proceedings
from Cameroon, (2) the assignment of defense counsel, and (3)
the scheduling of initial appearances each should count as part
of the "pre-trial period." The government of Rwanda, which
intervened as amicus curiae in this matter, argued that
Barayagwiza should be tried by the ICTR, but if the ICTR did
not try him, it should send Barayagwiza to a jurisdiction willing
and able to prosecute him, namely Rwanda.323 The Appeals
Chamber's initial decision to release Barayagwiza back to the
Cameroonian authorities (who had transferred him to the ICTR
in the first place) was unsatisfactory to the Rwandan
government, as "Cameroon has not passed legislation to punish
the crime of genocide."324 On February 22, 2000, Chief
Prosecutor Del Ponte argued the case for review before the
Appeals Chamber. She underscored how any delays did not
prejudice Barayagwiza and that failing to prosecute him for his
crime would be the true travesty of justice.125 In the end,
Prosecutor Del Ponte was successful, and on March 31, 2000,
the Appeals Chamber unanimously overturned its previous
decision to quash Barayagwiza's indictment. 26 The Appeals
322. Rwanda Approves Visa for U.N. Prosecutor, 149 N.Y. Times A4 (Dec. 4, 1999).
323. ICTR, Press Briefing ICTR/INFO-9-13-007, Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco




326. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for
Review or Reconsideration) (ICTR App. Chamber Mar. 31, 2000).
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Chamber found that Barayagwiza's rights had in fact been
infringed. However, "new facts" presented for the first time
during the request for review diminished the gravity of any
infringement of Barayagwiza's rights.327
For example, it was found that the actual period of pre-trial
delay was much shorter than previously believed; it was also
found that some of the delays faced by Barayagwiza were not
the responsibility of the Prosecutor.328 Because of this
diminished gravity, the previous decision to release
Barayagwiza was characterized as "disproportionate." 
329
Interestingly, although the Appeals Chamber held that this was
the first time it learned of these facts, it did not find that the
Prosecutor's office did not know or could not have discovered
these facts at the time of the November 1999 appeal.
Notwithstanding that the exercise of due diligence by the
prosecution could perhaps have resulted in the availability of
these facts in November 1999, the Appeals Chamber held that
the Prosecutor's motion should still succeed. Basing its decision
on "the wholly exceptional circumstances of [the] case," and
the "possible miscarriage of justice" that would arise by
releasing Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber found that the
apparent lack of due diligence by the prosecution and potential
availability of the information should not serve to defeat the
request for review.3 However, the Appeals Chamber did note
that, should Barayagwiza subsequently be found not guilty, he
should receive financial compensation. In the event he is found
guilty, then his eventual sentence is to be reduced to take into
account the infringements of his rights during the pre-trial
period.
The Barayagwiza crisis demonstrates the extent to which
criminal trials may create conflict between victims and due
process for the accused. It also demonstrates the extent to which
international institutions must be sensitive to the effects of their
decisions on the nations they were created to assist. The Appeals
327. Id. at T 74.
328. Id. at TTI 54-55, 62.
329. Id. at T 7 1.
330. Id. at 1 65.
331. Id. at$ 75.
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Chamber's principal motivation in originally quashing
Barayagwiza's indictment was the "integrity of the tribunal"
and the "loss of public confidence" that would arise from
"allowing [Barayagwiza] to stand trial in the face of such
violations of his rights." '332 What about the loss of public
confidence in Rwanda occasioned by his release? When setting
out the general considerations animating its decision to quash,
the Appeals Chamber went out of its way to emphasize that its
decisions are "based solely on justice and law" and not the
product of political pressure by Rwanda, the society affected by
the violence and the judicial response thereto.333
This gives rise to deeper questions. What is the primary
purpose of the ICTR-to promote accountability for mass
atrocity or to maximize its credibility in the eyes of the
international community? In the event of disputes between
international tribunals and post-conflict national governments,
who should give way? At the time of writing, Barayagwiza's
trial (together with two co-accused) is currently ongoing before
the ICTR Trial Chamber.
2. Prosecutor v. Kambanda
On October 19, 2000, the Appeals Chamber dismissed Jean
Kambanda's appeal against conviction and sentence.
33 4
Kambanda was Prime Minister of Rwanda during the genocide.
Kambanda had previously pled guilty to six counts of genocide
and crimes against humanity (although he subsequently sought
to challenge his own guilty plea and demanded a trial). He was
sentenced to life imprisonment on September 4, 1998."3' The
Appeals Chamber unanimously affirmed Kambanda' s
conviction and sentence. As to conviction, Kambanda had
argued that his initial guilty plea should be quashed, as he
allegedly had not been represented by a lawyer of his own
332. lan Fisher, Crisis Points Up Tough Choices for Tribunal on Rwanda, 149 N.Y.
Times, § 1, at 3 (Dec. 19, 1999).
333. Barayagwiza, T 34.
334. ICTR, Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-244.En, Kambanda Conviction and Sentence
Confirmed <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/244.htm> (Oct. 19, 2000);
Kambanda v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-23-A, Judgement (ICTR App. Chamber Oct. 19, 2000).
335. Kambanda, 2-4.
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choosing, he had been detained in unlawful conditions, and the
Trial Chamber had failed to determine that the guilty plea was
voluntary, informed and unequivocal.336 The Appeals Chamber
rejected all of these arguments. In so doing, it drew heavily from
its prior decisions in matters involving appeals from the ICTY
Trial Chambers, thereby promoting principles of consistency,
precedent, and stare decisis. In numerous contexts the ICTR
Appeals Chamber "adopted" the law or reasoning of the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, although it did not specifically state that it
was bound by such law or reasoning.337
As to sentence, the Appeals Chamber dismissed
Kambanda's allegations of excessiveness. Although
Kambanda's cooperation with the Prosecutor certainly was a
mitigating factor to be taken into consideration, the "intrinsic
gravity" of the crimes and the position of authority Kambanda
occupied in Rwanda outweighed any considerations of leniency
and justified the imposition of a life sentence.336 Kambanda,
detained in The Hague, awaits transfer to Mali, Benin, or
Swaziland (the three countries with which the ICTR has
concluded incarceration agreements). He is the first official head
of government to be convicted and punished for genocide
committed under his rule.
3. Prosecutor v. Akayesu
The appeal judgment in the matter of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a
local mayor, was pronounced on June 1, 2001." 9 Akayesu's
appeal was heard on November 1 and 2, 2000. The nub of the
charges relate to Akayesu's failure to prevent the killing of
Tutsis or otherwise respond with assistance to quell the violence,
notwithstanding that he had authority and responsibility to do
so.340 The Trial Chamber's groundbreaking 1998 judgment in the
Akayesu matter provided judicial notice that the Rwandan
336. Id. at 12, 36-37,49.
337. Id. at 1 25-26, 61, 75, 77, 84, 107, 1I 0-11.
338. Kambanda, f1 119, 126.
339. Le Procureur c/Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Arr&t (Judgement) (ICTR App. Chamber
June 1, 2001) (available only in French at time of writing).
340. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 12-23 (ICTR Tr. Chamber
Sept. 2, 1998).
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violence was organized, planned, ethnically motivated, and
undertaken with the intent to wipe out the Tutsis (as discussed
earlier, this latter element being required to constitute genocide
under the definitions provided by the Genocide Convention).
Akayesu was the first person convicted of genocide by an
international court. In addition, the initial Akayesu judgment
marked the first time that an international tribunal ruled that rape
and other forms of systematic sexual violence could constitute
genocide. It was also the first conviction of an individual for
rape as a crime against humanity. Akayesu was sentenced to life
in prison. 4'
The Appeals Chamber rejected Akayesu's appeal against
his conviction and sentence. In so doing, it dealt with a broad
array of issues, some of which were not raised by counsel on
appeal. Of significance is the Appeals Chamber's finding that
the right of an indigent person to be represented by a lawyer free
of charge did not imply the right to select the assigned lawyer.
3 42
In other words, the right to free assistance from a lawyer does
not confer the right to choose one's counsel. The right to choose
counsel "is only guaranteed for those who can assume the
financial burden of lawyer's fees," although the indigent
defendant can choose from a list of counsel kept by the ICTR
Registrar who will take that choice into account when assigning
counsel.3 43 But the Registrar "is not necessarily bound by the
wishes of the indigent accused person, and has wide powers of
discretion [that can be exercised] in the interests of justice."44
The Appeals Chamber also held that there were insufficient
grounds to find that the lawyers representing Akayesu were
incompetent, as alleged by Akayesu.3 45 Also rejected were
Akayesu's arguments that the ICTR was pursuing selective
justice, was biased, and was lacking in impartiality; and that the
341. Id.; ICTR, Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-269.EN, Appeals Chamber Upholds
Sentences in the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana Trials <http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/PRESSREI2001/269.htm> (June 1, 2001).
342. Akayesu, 61.
343. Fondation Hirondelle, Appeals Court Says Indigent Detainees Cannot Choose
Lawyer, available at <http://www.hirondelle.org> (June 1, 2001) (citing Appeals Court
President Claude Jorda).
344. Id.
345. Akayesu, T$ 80-84.
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examination of witnesses was irregular and that Akayesu's
detention was illegal.3 6
The Appeals Chamber also rejected a motion by Akayesu
that it reconsider an earlier decision that had rejected additional
grounds for appeal. In fact, the Appeals Chamber held that this
motion constituted an abuse of process as reconsideration of
final decisions must remain absolutely exceptional.3 47 Akayesu's
lawyers were sanctioned under the Rules of the ICTR, and the
Appeals Chamber ordered the ICTR Registrar to withhold
payment to these lawyers for the preparation of the impugned
motion. 34 ' Throughout the Akayesu decision, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber made extensive reference to judgements by the ICTY
Trial and Appeals Chambers.349
4. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana
On May 21, 1999, the Trial Chamber convicted Clment
Kayishema, a former local governmental official, and Obed
Ruzindana, a businessman, of genocide and crimes against
humanity and sentenced them to life imprisonment and twenty-
five years imprisonment respectively. On June 1, 2001, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed their appeals, thus confirming their
convictions and sentences.350 The appellants had unsuccessfully
alleged lack of equality of arms, defective indictment, and
inadequate proof.
346. Id. at $I 92, 97, 101, 319, 326, 376.
347. Fondation Hirondelle, Appeals Court Confirms Judgement on Former Mayor,
available at <http://www.hirondelle.org> (June 1, 2001).
348. Id.
349. See e.g. 9191 77, 91, 96, 117, 135, 286, & 336, as well as others throughout the
decision.
350. Le Procureur c/ Kayishema, ICTR-95-I-A, Motifs de L'Arr&t (Reasons for
Judgement) (ICTR App. Chamber June 1, 2001). ICTR, Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-
269.En, Appeals Chamber Upholds Sentences in the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana
Trials <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/269.htm> (June I, 2001). At the
time of writing, the actual judgment was available only in French.
351. "Egalitd des armes" in French. This phrase means that the prosecutor and defense
must have access to identical resources and means. The Appeals Chamber held that,
although the right to a fair trial implicitly includes "equality of arms," Kayishema, $ 67,
this does not mean that the prosecution and defense must have equal resources and
personnel at their disposal. Id. at 1 69. Rather, there must be sufficient resources made
available to allow a good defense to be put forward. Id. at 9 72.
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This judgment clarifies the law regarding the mental
element for genocide and the type of circumstantial evidence
that could establish that mental element. It also addresses the
defense of command authority by affirming the approach taken
by the ICTY in the Celebici case."'
CONCLUSION
The ICTR and ICTY Appeals Chambers have a novel
structure and are significantly contributing to the development
of international criminal and humanitarian law. Receptiveness to
the jurisprudence of the Tribunals has varied among nation-
states; this variation reflects general attitudes toward the
incorporation and harmonization of international law within
domestic legal systems. There has been some movement in
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and European countries
toward a sedimentary integration of international law; in the
United States, however, a more pronounced separation between
national and international law remains.353 Professor Drinan
recently observed, "American jurists continue to be uneasy
about utilizing norms that derive from customary international
law."114 However, the realities of globalization in the business
and practice of law oblige courts, lawmakers, and law schools of
all nation-states to improve the interface between domestic and
international norms.
352. Kayishema, $$ 293-304.
353. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's
Liberal Theory, 12 European J. Intl. L. 183, 217 n. 161 (2001). The Canadian Supreme
Court is comfortable turning to international law when appropriate and does so with
considerable respect. See e.g. supra n. 10 (regarding U.S. v. Burns (Supreme Court of
Canada extensively relying on developments in international law regarding the death
penalty to depart from its prior decisions and refuse to extradite two Canadians to the
United States to face capital murder charges unless assurances were given that the death
penalty would not be sought)). But see Alvarez, supra, at 203 (providing some skepticism
at the actual level of integration of international law in Canada and Australia).
354. Robert F. Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame 96 (Yale U. Press 2001). This unease
operates within the federal courts and particularly within state courts and covers customary
as well as convention-based international law. Id. at 101-102 ("The challenge underlying
the struggle of American courts concerning how and when they should use international
law as a source of their decisions is complex and profound. Most state judges do not want
to give their opponents or critics an opportunity to challenge them on the grounds that they
relied on some international document as the equivalent of sound American law.").
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This new interface should strive to create a connection
between international and domestic law as opposed to the
current parallelism that exists in the law of nearly all nations.
This parallelism is an artificial relic as in the practice of law the
boundaries between international law and domestic law are
eroding. Even public international law, hitherto the haughty
preserve of inter-State relations, can no longer be limited to
relations between States, as it covers (and increasingly so) the
relations between individuals and States as well as individuals
and international organizations.355 Moreover, the events of
September 11, 2001, reveal the pressing need for international
law to regulate non-State actors as well.
In the end, the Tribunals are contributing to an important
paradigm shift in the way in which human rights and criminal
accountability for human rights abusers is perceived. Although
the ICTY and ICTR deal only with a small subset of human
rights abuses, they have helped mainstream the involvement of
national courts in promoting accountability for human rights
abuses committed either at home or abroad. Some of these
national trials have taken place in the United States, where they
can be expected to continue and diversify.356 A tangible and
functional body of human rights law is emerging that is weaving
its way even into federal common law. This mainstreaming into
355. See generally Kenneth S. Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New International
Organization: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in International
Criminal Law, vol. III, Enforcement 693 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed., Transnational
Pubs. 1999).
356. See e.g. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (victims of Bosnian conflict
successfully suing Karadzic, the leader of Bosnian Serb forces, in the United States for
damages); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (wrongful death action
involving a Paraguayan police official); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 Ith Cir.
1996) (compensatory and punitive damages to victims who were tortured and subject to
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in Ethiopia); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (lawsuits involving the "dirty war" conducted by the Argentine
military); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995)
(awarding $2 billion in damages to a class of almost 10,000 members in litigation
involving the former President of the Philippines). United States courts also are hearing
claims involving damages for terrorism, property restitution, and even claims by
indigenous peoples abroad regarding the preservation of environmental and natural
resources. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 For.
Affairs 102, 102 (Sept./Oct. 2000). Lawsuits are also pending regarding civil liability for
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.
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national courts of international human rights issues will only be
accentuated by the eventual-and seemingly inevitable-
creation of the International Criminal Court. As the International
Criminal Court is designed to be complementary to national
proceedings, it creates incentive for nation-states to encourage
the prosecution of human rights abuses in their own courts, so as
to avoid the threat of international intervention.
ADDENDUM-NEW ICTY RULES
After the authors completed this article, the ICTY released
Document IT/199 (effective December 28, 2001), significantly
changing the Rules of Procedure and Evidence concerning
appeals. See <http://www.un.org/icty>. Highlights include:
Rule 54 bis now states that a party's interlocutory appeal of
the denial of a motion to require a State to produce documents is
subject to leave of a bench of three Appeals Chamber Judges.
This modifies text at note 136-37, supra.
Rule 73(C) now provides that requests for certification of
interlocutory appeals of decisions on evidence or procedure
must be made within seven days of the decision, and if
certification is granted, the appeal must be taken within seven
days. This modifies text at notes 141-42, supra.
Rule 75(D) states that, during appellate proceedings, the
Appeals Chamber may vary or rescind orders to protect victims
and witnesses. This is a new provision.
Rule 108 now provides that a party must file a notice of
appeal against a judgment within thirty days, setting forth the
grounds of appeal. The party must identify the challenged ruling
by date and/or transcript page, and must indicate the substance
of the alleged errors and the relief sought. Variation of the
grounds of appeal requires leave of the Appeals Chamber, for
good cause. This modifies text at notes 102, 104, 108, supra.
Rules 111 and 112 provide new briefing times in non-
expedited appeals: for Appellant's brief, seventy five days after
notice of appeal; for Respondent's brief, forty days after
Appellant's. This modifies text at notes 107-08, supra.
Counsel in both the ICTY and ICTR should always check
with the Tribunals for the latest changes.

